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ABSTRACT
This study aims to empirically investigate the effect of taxes on economic growth 
in 45 states in the United States in the period 1960 to 1999. The literature review shows 
that both state level and country level studies result with two different answers on how 
taxes affect economic growth. Most of those studies show a negative impact, while some 
significant studies show a positive effect of taxes on economic growth. In overall, this 
study has shown that both initially and subsequently, taxes have a negative impact on 
state economic growth.
The problem addressed mostly in my study is the endogeneity of tax variables in 
the growth model. Further, the efforts to find instruments for tax variable are very crucial. 
I find that demographic, economic, and political structure variables are important for the 
determination of the change in state tax rates. Special for political issues, this empirical 
information supports the common knowledge that Democratic legislatures favor higher 




LI. Taxes and Economic Growth
The relationship between taxes and economic growth has long been a subject of 
interest to researchers and policymakers alike. After decades of research, the nature of 
the relationship is still unresolved. For example, Vedder (1995) finds that higher state 
and local taxes had negative effects on personal income growth from 1960 to 1993. A 
study by Becsi (1996) also shows that relative marginal tax rates had a significant 
negative effect on state growth over the period 1961 to 1992. On the other hand, a 
significant minority of studies [Quan and Beck (1987), Yu, Wallace, and Nardinelli 
(1991), and Chemick (1997)] report no evidence to support a hypothesis that state taxes 
lower economic grovidh—in fact they find some positive correlations between tax 
variables and economic growth.
Despite the large number of empirical studies on this subject,' there is still room 
for research to make a significant contribution because many methodological issues 
have not been addressed. Among these are: the causality o f taxes and growth, finding 
instrumental variables for taxes, appropriate modeling of the error structure in cross- 
sectional time series data, and incorporation of insights from modem growth theory. I 
examine these aspects in my study to obtain a better analysis on the effects of taxes on 
state economic growth.
I empirically investigate the simultaneous path o f how changes in state tax rates, 
political structures, and economic growth affect each other. I use cross-sectional, time- 
series data from U.S. states on economic, demographic, and political variables. The
See chapter II for a more comprehensive literature review.
empirical model in my study allows for testing the validity of the inclusion o f political 
structures as instrumental variables in the model. In other words, this study will fill the 
gaps in the literature by empirically addressing the endogeneity problem in the 
relationship between taxes and economic growth.
Relatively few of the empirical studies on state taxation and growth use cross- 
sectional, time-series data in their empirical analyses. Of these, none address the 
complexity of possible error structures beyond straight-forward groupwise 
heteroscedasticity. In contrast, I employ the cross-sectional, time-series approach with 
5-year averaging to net out short-lived shocks and business cycles. I also conduct 
different estimation methods starting from ordinary least squares to two-stage least 
squares with panel corrected standard errors^ to address the problem of serial 
correlation and cross-sectional correlation in my model. Therefore, I should be able to 
produce better estimates o f the significance of tax effects on economic growth.
1.2. Possible Avenues by Which Taxes Could Affect Growth Rates
In theory, taxes levied by the government may have both positive and negative 
effects on economic growth. The positive effects of taxation can be explained by the 
fact that the value of economic resources and the ability to transform resources into 
output are greater to the degree that property is protected, roads and telecommunication 
infrastructures are provided, and domestic tranquility is insured. If growth were higher 
in these public sectors and tax revenues are used to finance these sectors, the higher 
taxes would be associated with higher economic growth.
The negative effects o f taxation could be explained by the concept o f 
“deadweight loss” of a tax. When a tax is imposed on a good, the tax reduces consumer
See Beck and Katz (1995).
and producer surpluses by an amount that is greater than the tax revenue generated. The 
difference between the decrease in total consumer and producer surplus and total tax 
revenues is referred to as the deadweight loss of taxation. As the tax gets larger, the 
deadweight loss increases more proportionate to the tax increases.
Taxes are of interest not only because of their suspected effects on state 
economic performance, but also because they reflect the color of political views. It is 
common to acknowledge that Democrats favor higher tax rates compared to 
Republicans at both the state and federal levels. Studies by Poterba (1994, 1997), 
Beasley and Case (AER, 1995), (QJE, 1995), and Crain and Crain (1998) suggest the 
importance of political variables on state spending and expenditure decisions.
O f course, modem macroeconomic theory has been much concerned with the 
topic o f economic growth. Exogenous growth theory predicts that states will grow at 
the same rate in steady-state. However, states may be characterized by different 
steady-state levels of income according to their respective saving rates, population 
growth rates, and other factors. States out o f steady-state will grow at different rates. 
The further an economy is below its steady-state level, the faster the economy should 
grow. If states have similar steady-state levels o f income, then this behavior will result 
in “convergence”, as states that are located further from their steady-state levels “catch­
up” to states that are further along their growth paths.
This prediction of convergence is based on the neoclassical growth model, 
specifically the Solow Growth model that is complemented by Baumol (1986), who 
introduces the notion of “conditional convergence”. Studies by Barro and Sala-i-Martin 
(1991,1992) and Carlino and Mills (1993) empirically find evidence o f convergence
among U.S. states. I will incorporate the insights o f convergence theory in my growth 
model to provide some new evidences about the empirical relationship between state 
taxes and economic growth.
1.3. History of Tax Rates in the U.S.: 1960-1999^
Figure I.l summarizes tax data from 48 of the 50 states (Alaska and Hawaii are 
omitted). The period 1960-1999 breaks down into three distinct periods with respect to 
state and local tax policy: (i) 1960-1973, (ii) 1973-1982, and (ill) 1982-1999. From 
1960 to 1973, states experienced a steep increase in their state and local tax burdens. 
Overall Tax Burden, defined as the ratio of total state and local tax revenues over 
national Personal Income, rose from 9.5 percent to 11.8 percent. In other words, state 
and local Tax Burdens rose approximately 25 percent over a period of less than 15 
years.
This trend of higher state and local taxes was primarily driven by two factors. 
The first was demographic. The children o f the “baby boomers” started to enter the 
public school systems during this time period, putting a great strain on the primary and 
secondary school systems. The importance o f this for state and local tax systems can 
be appreciated when one considers that more than half o f total state and local spending 
was directed towards elementary and secondary education in the early 1960’s.
A second factor was ideological. The economy as a whole was undergoing a 
general trend towards public sector expansion. As a result, all levels of government 
were expected to address problems that previously were considered outside their
 ̂ This discussion borrows heavily from Steven D. Gold, “Tax Reform, State”, in Cordes, Ebel and 
Gravelle, editors, The Encvclooedia o f Taxation and Tax Policv. pages 395-398, Washington, D.C.: The 
Urban Institute Press, 1999.
domain. As a result, state and local spending on higher education, health, and social 
services increased dramatically during this period.
This expansion of state and local services required increased funding sources. 
Between 1961 and 1971, 9 states adopted broad-based personal income taxes, 9 
adopted corporate income taxes, and 10 adopted sales taxes. By way of comparison, no 
states adopted personal income taxes, and only 3 states adopted corporate income taxes, 
during the preceding period of 1947-1960.
The period 1973-1982 saw a major retrenchment in the size of state and local 
governments. Overall Tax Burden declined from 11.8 percent in 1973, to 10.2 percent 
in 1982. The steep increase of state and local tax rates during the 1960’s and early 
1970’s provoked an anti-tax reaction, characterized by Proposition 13 in California 
(1978) and Proposition 2 1/2 in Massachusetts (1980), and the election of Ronald 
Reagan in 1980.
Property tax relief was a major political issue in the 1970’s. This was 
evidenced by the fact that the ratio of property taxes to Personal Income fell from 4.6 
percent in 1973 to 3.3 percent in 1982. Along with the overall decrease in property 
taxes, there occurred a shift towards greater centralization in tax collections. States 
began to take on a substantial share of the educational burden borne by localities. As 
well, states assumed a number of functions like welfare and Medicaid that previously 
had been carried out at the local level of government.
In addition, a number of states adopted tax indexation; that is, automatic 
“rebracketing” of income categories for tax purposes as inflation drove nominal 
incomes larger. This served to eliminate the automatic tax increases that accompanied
inflation. Finally, a number of states adopted tax and spending limitation legislation. 
New Jersey was the first in this regard when it passed legislation in 1976 restricting the 
growth of state appropriations to the rate of increase of Personal Income. By 1982, a 
total of 19 states had adopted like legislation, limiting the growth of state expenditures 
to some function of inflation and/or population increases.
The period from 1982 to 1999 saw a gradual increase in state and local tax 
burdens, from 10.2 percent to 11.0 percent. The reasons for this increase are not clear. 
It may be due to the fact that a number of states restmctured their income tax systems 
to make them more progressive. As state incomes grew in the 1990’s, this would serve 
to cause revenues to grow even faster. Another factor may be the fact that many states 
broadened their income and sales tax bases. Whatever the reasons, this gradual 
increase has had the effect o f returning state and local tax burdens to relatively high 
levels not seen since the late 1970’s.
The appendix A presents figures reporting the time series of state and local Tax 
Burdens for each of the 48 states over the time period 1960-1999. On average. New 
York, Wyoming, Vermont, Wisconsin, and Minnesota are the five states with the 
highest tax rates during this time period (though Wyoming’s high tax rate is mostly due 
to high severance taxes accompanied by an oil boom during the 1980’s). New York’s 
average state and local tax rates was 14.2 percent. Wyoming had on average 13.2 
percent o f tax rates, while Vermont, Wisconsin, and Minnesota had average tax rates in 
the 12 percent range. Four southern states: Alabama, Termessee, Missouri, and 
Virginia, and one non-southern state. New Hampshire, comprised the five states with 
the lowest tax rates during this period.
1.4. History of Growth Rates in the U.S.: 1960-1999
Figure 1.2 represents the economic growth rates experienced by the 48 
continental states in the US from 1960-1999. Two distinct periods are evident from the 
graph. The period from 1960 to 1980 shows a general decline in economic growth 
rates, as measured by both Real Personal Income and Real PCPI. In contrast, the 
period from 1980 to 1999 shows a gradual increase in economic growth.
A comparison of Figures I.l and 1.2 does not reveal a clear pattern between state 
and local Tax Burden and state economic growth. While the decline in economic 
growth in the first period coincides with a general period of increasing Tax Burdens, 
the increase in economic growth in the latter period also coincides with a period of 
gradually increasing Tax Burdens.
The Appendix reports time series o f economic growth rates for each of the 48 
continental states for the period 1960-1999. I find that Nevada, Arizona, Florida, 
Georgia, and Colorado were the 5 states with the highest growth rates in terms o f both 
real Personal Income and real Per Capita Personal Income (PCPI). In contrast, New 
York, Iowa, Pennsylvania, Ohio, and West Virginia had the lowest growth rates.
1.5. Organization of this Study
This study proceeds as follows: Chapter II presents a review o f the existing 
quantitative and qualitative empirical literature pertaining to the effect o f taxes on 
economic growth. Chapter III presents my empirical model o f taxes and economic 
growth. Further, it explains the specification methods that I will conduct to analyze the 
effects o f state and local taxes. Chapter IV presents the essay, “Determinants o f State 
Tax Rates” . The main focus in this study, which is the analysis of tax effects on
economic growth, is presented in Chapter V. Finally, Chapter VI summarizes my 
findings and suggests possible extensions for future research.
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW OF THE RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN TAXES AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
Empirical studies of the relationship between taxes and economic growth have 
produced inconsistent results. Most studies find a negative correlation between taxes and 
economic growth. However, a significant minority of studies reports no correlation, and 
some find evidence of a positive relationship.
This chapter reviews some of the important papers in this literature. The purpose 
o f this review is to identify important data, specification, and estimation issues to guide 
my study. Previous studies can be divided into two groups: (i) studies that exploit 
differences within and across states in the U.S., and (ii) studies that exploit differences 
within and across countries. Most U.S. studies focus on the forty-eight, continental 
states. In contrast, there is great diversity in the composition of the data sets used by 
researchers using international data.
II I. State-Level Analyses of the Relationship between Taxes and Economic Growth
Romans and Subrahmanyam (1979). Romans and Subrahmanyam (1979) are 
primarily interested in the effect of tax progressivity on state income growth. Using 
single equation, ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models, they employ three 
dependent variables: (i) growth rate in state personal income, (ii) growth rate in state non- 
agricultural employment, and (iii) growth rate in state per capita personal income. The 
data employed by Romans and Subrahmanyam consist of cross-sectional observations of 
the forty-eight contiguous states from 1964 to 1974.
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Romans and Subrahmanyam use two groups of explanatory variables in their 
models, tax variables and control variables. Three tax variables are included: (i) tax 
progressivity, (ii) personal income tax rate, and (iii) business tax rate. Tax progressivity 
is shown to have a negative and significant effect on the growth rate in state personal 
income and state non-agricultural employment equations. The personal income tax rate 
is estimated to be insignificantly correlated with income growth; while business tax rate 
is positively and significantly related with economic growth
Romans and Subrahmanyam (1979) use the following control variables: (i) the 
ratio of non-agricultural to agricultural income, (ii) nonagricultural earnings, (iii) regional 
growth rate (minus the state’s growth rate), and (iv) the percentage of state tax revenues 
going to transfer payments. Only the last two variables’ coefficients are significant. The 
percentage of state revenues going to transfer payments is negatively significant affecting 
economic growth.
Romans and Subrahmanyam (1979) conclude that the level o f state personal 
income taxes is unrelated to economic growth. On the other hand, the level of state 
business taxes is positively and significantly related to the growth. Tax progressivity is 
estimated to have a significant and negative effect on the growth.
The main data sources are the US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic 
Analysis, Survey o f  Current Business, August 1975; and the US Department of Labor, 
Manpower Report o f  the President, 1970 and 1975.
Dve (1980). Dye (1980) investigates twenty-one potential determinants of 
economic growth. He examines simple bivariate relationships between alternative 
explanatory variables and-three different measures of economic growth: (i) growth in
12
personal income (1972-1976), (ii) growth in employment (1972-1976), and (iii) growth in 
value added by manufacturing (1972-1976). He groups the potential determinants of 
economic growth into two categories, tax variables and non-tax variables. The tax 
variables are further categorized into two groups: (i) tax burdens (including total tax 
burden, income tax burden, and sales tax burden); and (ii) business tax rates (including 
corporate taxes, worker income taxes, and executive income taxes). The non-tax variables 
include years since statehood, population size, per capita highway spending, measure of 
state revenues going to redistribution, a dummy variable to indicate whether a state has 
Right to Work legislation, and the percentage of the workforce that is unionized.
The author uses cross-sectional data consisting of observations from the fifty 
states over the period 1972-1976. The values for the explanatory variables are taken 
from 1970 or earlier.
For the purposes o f this review, I will focus on the tax variables. Simple bivariate 
analyses find no evidence that any of the tax variables affect economic growth. The 
multivariate analyses also found little evidence that taxes matter. Only the growth o f 
value added by manufacturing equation produced a significant tax result. In that 
equation, tax burden is negatively and significantly related to economic growth. On the 
other hand the results show that spending policies, especially per capita highway 
spending in the late 1960s, are closely associated with growth in income, employment 
and productivity in the 1970s. Age o f settlement and stable government turn out to be 
influential determinants o f economic growth. Unionization appears to have a slight 
negative effect on economic growth. Dye (1980) concludes that there is little correlation 
between taxes and economic growth.
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Helms (1985). Helms (1985) is one of the first studies to use cross-sectional time 
series (panel) data. He is interested in identifying the separate, independent effects of 
taxes and spending on state per capita personal income. He uses a least squares dummy 
variable (LSDV) model that incorporates both state and time fixed effects. He also uses 
instrumental variable techniques to address endogeneity in one of the explanatory 
variables.
Helms (1985) uses the log of state personal income as the dependent variable. Tax 
variables include (i) the rate of property taxation and (ii) the rate of taxation from all 
other taxes. He also includes the rate o f user fees. The nontax variables consist o f (i) the 
state deficit rate, (ii) the federal source revenue rate, (iii) the health expenditures rate, (iv) 
the highway expenditures rate, (v) the rate o f other expenditures (minus transfer 
payments), (vi) relative wages; (vii) the unionization rate; and (viii) the population 
density. All rates are calculated as a percent o f state personal income.
The estimates suggest that increasing taxes or fees to finance transfer payments 
has a negative and significant effect on a state’s personal income. The coefficients for 
many of the expenditure variables are positive and significant. Relative wages and 
unionization are negatively related to ineome, but have only marginal significance. 
Population density is estimated to have a negative and significant relationship with state 
income.
Helms’s data consists of a panel of observations on the 48 continental states from 
1965 to 1979, totaling 672 observations. Data on state personal income was obtained 
from the U.S. Census Bureau, Survey o f  Current Business. All tax and expenditure data 
were taken from the U.S. Census Bureau, Government Finance series. Relative wage is
14
data was obtained from the Handbook o f  Labor Statistics. The unionization rate was 
taken from the Directory o f  National Unions and Employee Organization.
Canto and Webb (1987V Canto and Webb (1987) estimate individual time-series 
equations for each of the states to determine the relationship between taxes and economic 
growth. With the assumption of factor price equalization but possible inequality in per 
capita market incomes across states, they argue that, “divergences in market incomes 
across states is attributable, in part to the impact of state government fiscal policies on the 
supply o f services of the immobile factor of production across states” (p. 187). Further, 
they state: “ . . .  the after-tax factor return and/or income of the immobile factor need not 
be equalized across states. Therefore, within this scenario, state and local fiscal policy 
can influence the income and after-tax return of the immobile factor across states” (p.
189). Their theoretical model allows markets to be in disequilibrium and looks like, but is 
different from, a partial adjustment model.
The dependent variable in Canto and Webb’s study is the change in the log of 
state real per capita personal income. The tax variable is the change in the difference 
between the state tax rate and the national tax rate. Non-tax variables consist o f the 
change in the log o f national real per capita personal income; the change in the difference 
between state and national real per capita, non-transfer government spending; and 
national real per capita transfer spending.
Canto and Webb (1987) estimate separate models for each state. They use both 
OLS and 2SLS regression. The 2SLS regression is employed to address possible 
endogeneity in state taxes and transfers. They conclude that taxes have significant and
15
negative effects on state real per capita personal income. The spending variables have 
insignificant coefficients.
Canto and Webb (1987) use observations on the forty-eight continental states 
from 1957-77. Data for federal government purchases of goods and services, transfer 
payments, tax revenues and personal incomes are taken directly from the National 
Income Accounts. State population values are obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau, 
Current Population Reports. State tax revenues, expenditures and transfer payments are 
collected from the US Department of Commerce, States ' Government Finances. Finally, 
the states’ personal income figures are obtained from the U.S. Bureau o f Economic 
Analysis.
Ouan and Beck (1987). Quan and Beck (1987) are primarily interested in 
estimating the effect o f education expenditures on state economic growth. The dependent 
variables used in their empirical analysis are: (i) state relative to national personal 
income; (ii) state relative to national wage rate; and (iii) state relative to national 
employment in manufacturing sectors. The tax variables employed are current and lagged 
values o f state tax burden relative to national tax burden, where tax revenues exclude 
severance taxes.
Quan and Helms also employ the following nontax variables: (i) current and 
lagged values of state relative to local education expenditures; (ii) current and lagged 
values o f state relative to national higher education expenditures; (iii) current and lagged 
values of state relative to national non-welfare and non-education expenditures; (iv) 
lagged value of the log o f relative average hourly earnings in manufacturing; and (v) state
16
dummies to cover some potential effects of state specific variables that are not included 
in the model.
Quan and Beck’s (1987) main finding is that education spending has a significant 
and positive effect on economic growth in the Northeast region, but a significantly 
negative effect in the Sunbelt. With respect to taxes, they find evidence that current and 
lagged values of state tax burden positively impact economic growth in both the 
Northeast and Sunbelt regions. These positive estimates occur in all model equations. 
However, the significance levels vary between the two subsamples. The estimate of tax 
variable is significant in the Northeast region but insignificant in the Sunbelt region. This 
significance result is consistent across all three equations.
Quan and Beck (1987) use cross-sectional and time series data for 32 states for 
the fiscal years 1964 through 1983. The equations’ regressions are estimated on two sub­
samples: the “Northeast”, including 15 states in the New England, Mid-east, and Great 
Lakes regions (excluding Michigan); and the “Sunbelt”, including 17 states in the 
Southeast and Southwest regions plus California. The main sources o f data are the annual 
of Government Finances, State Government Tax Collections and the Handbook o f  Labor 
Statistics.
Vedder (19901. Vedder (1990) places the relationship between state and local 
taxes and economic growth within two models of public provision of services. The fi rst 
model represents public provision o f services using the theory of the firm/public choice 
approach. In this model, taxes are also viewed as potential income in the form of 
economic rents that can be appropriated by special interests (e.g. public employees, such 
as when compensation is paid to public employees beyond levels required by market
17
forces). Vedder (1990) also sees the relationship between state and local taxes and 
economic growth being shaped by the Tiebout Hypothesis. According to this theory, 
individuals migrate in and out of localities based upon their preferences for government 
services.
The dependent variable in Vedder's (1990) study is the change in the log o f state 
per capita personal income (1970-1980). Another model uses the same variable for the 
period from 1980 through 1988. As the tax variable, Vedder uses the change in state and 
local tax rate per $1,000 of personal income. He further employs four control variables:
(i) the level of real per capita income at the beginning of the relevant time period; (ii) the 
proportion of the labor force belonging to labor unions at the beginning of the period; (iii) 
the age o f the state as measured by years since statehood; and (iv) the proportion of 
personal income derived from the mining industry in 1980.
The results show that positive changes in state tax rates are negatively and 
significantly associated with lower state economic growth. The negative and significant 
relationship is estimated to be stronger in the 1980s than the 1970s. The continued 
negative correlation of tax changes to economic growth in both models strengthens 
confidence in the enduring nature of the tax-growth relationship.
Vedder (1990) employs cross-sectional data comprised o f observed changes in the 
forty-eight continental states over two time periods: (i) 1970-1980, and (ii) 1980-1988.
He does not list his data sources.
Yu, Wallace, and Nardinelli (19911. Yu, Wallace, and Nardinelli (1991) test two 
hypotheses about state income growth. The first is income convergence, or the “catching
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up” hypothesis. The second is that taxes discourage economic growth (the fiscal 
hypothesis).
They start their analysis with the assumption that states have different levels of 
physical capital, human resources, and technology. Mobility of capital and resources, in 
the long run, should cause the respective rates o f return to equalize across states. 
However, equalization will be incomplete since there are permanent barriers between 
political jurisdictions. Alternatively, differences in fiscal environments between 
jurisdictions can lead to different growth rates: fiscal differences generate differences in 
growth rates due to different marginal tax rates. Yu, Wallace and Nardinelli (1991 ) 
address the question: What force is stronger in determining economic growth? (i) 
continuing adjustment to historical imbalance (convergence), or (ii) the effects o f current 
fiscal policy decisions (taxation)?
Yu, Wallace and Nardinelli (1991) examine seven time periods: 1929 to 1985; 
1929 to 1945; 1945 to 1957; 1957 to 1985; 1957 to 1965; 1965 to 1975; and 1975 to 
1985. For each time period, they estimate a regression equation using the percentage 
change in real state per capita personal income as the dependent variable. For the tax 
variable, they use the ratio of state taxes to personal income. Other explanatory variables 
are real per capita personal income at the beginning of the period and the share o f state 
expenditures at the beginning of period.
The catching up hypothesis predicts that the rate o f growth of real per capita 
personal income will be inversely related to real per capita personal income at the 
beginning of period. Relatively poor states should grow faster than relatively wealthy
19
States. The hypothesis of fiscal policy predicts that increased expenditures will generate 
increased economic growth; whereas increased taxes will hinder economic growth.
The results o f Yu, Wallace, and Nardinelli's study (1991) show that catching up 
exerts a powerful influence on states’ rates of growth. The coefficient signs of initial 
income are negative and statistically significant in all equations. Convergence appears to 
explain the long-run differences in state growth. In contrast, state fiscal policies are 
estimated not to be significant determinants of state growth rates. Initial expenditure 
performs poorly in every specification and time period. Likewise, there is little evidence 
to support the hypothesis that state taxes lower economic growth.
Yu, Wallace and Nardinelli (1991) use cross-sectional observations from all 50 
states. Per capita personal income is taken from the U.S. Census Bureau. Date on state 
expenditures and taxes come from the U.S. Census Bureau, the Survey o f Current 
Business, and other bureaus within the U.S. Department of Commerce.
Mullen and Williams 119941. A distinctive feature of the study by Mullen and 
Williams (1994) is its emphasis on marginal tax rates. Similar to other studies, Mullen 
and Williams incorporate convergence theory in their analysis. However, they argue that 
differences in fiscal and/or other public policies can generate permanent differences in 
the level of state per capita income. For example, some states may provide an 
economically attractive tax environment that is conducive to private investment.
Mullen and Williams (1994) develop an ad hoc empirical model, but claim that 
their model draws heavily upon the disequilibrium-adjustment models popularized in 
migration research. Mullen and Williams further explain that the disequilibrium- 
adjustment model is the model that “typically relates changes in the dependent variable
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over the period to levels of the explanatory variables at the beginning of period” (p. 691). 
There are three model specifications analyzed in their study: (i) a basic output and 
productivity equation, (ii) a basic output equation based upon the stock of public capital, 
and (iii) a basic output and productivity equation excluding outlier states/
Dependent variables consist of the compound annual growth rate o f (i) real Gross 
State Product, 1969-1986 and (ii) productivity growth (compound annual growth rate of 
real Gross State Product minus factor share-weighted growth in capita and labor inputs, 
1969-1986). Explanatory variables consist of two categories: (i) tax variables, measuring 
both the average and marginal tax rates; and (ii) control variables, including initial real 
per capita income, the compound growth rate for the stock of public capital, the civilian 
labor force, and the private capital stock from 1969-1986.
Mullen and Williams (1994) are interested in determining whether taxes depress 
economic growth. They find that average tax rates are generally insignificant in all model 
specifications. On the other hand, marginal tax rates are found to be negatively and 
significantly related to economic growth. With respect to the nontax variables, their 
results lend support to the convergence hypothesis. States with higher initial levels of per 
capita income have significantly lower rates of economic growth. Labor force growth 
and increase in the stocks o f both public and private capital are positively and 
significantly related to interstate economic growth. Further, states with tax rates that are 
high relative to neighboring states have slower rates o f economic growth.
The data employed by Mullen and Williams (1994) consist o f cross-sectional 
observations o f the forty-eight, continental states 1969 through 1986 (except one model
Arizona, Louisiana, New York, and South Dakota are found to have a substantial impact on a 
majority o f the regression coefficients. So they are excluded to generate a better empirical result.
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specification where four outlier states are excluded). Data on Gross State Product and 
per capita personal income are obtained from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. All 
tax and expenditure variables are gathered from the U.S. Census Bureau, Government 
Finance Series, The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relation (ACIR), State- 
Local Taxation Industrial Location, and the Commerce Clearing House, State Tax 
Handbook. Last, the estimates of total private and total public capital stocks for 
individual states are taken from the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
Crown and Wheat (1995). Crown and Wheat (1995) are interested in identifying 
the factors responsible for the long-run convergence in state per capita incomes. Despite 
a fact that this study has no tax variable as explanatory variable, their study is included 
because o f interesting demographic variables utilized in their model. Moreover, they 
focus on the differences between the fast-growing southern states and the slow-growth 
“industrial” states (hereafter non-southern). After 1950, the income gap between 
southern and non-southern states closed rapidly. The convergence process did not run 
smoothly from 1978 until 1987. During this time period, there was a farm crisis and a 
decline in energy prices that hurt the low-income states but helped the high-income 
states. However, convergence reappeared in the 1987-1993 period.
Crown and Wheat (1995) use percentage change in state per capita income as the 
dependent variable in their regression model. They employ cross-sectional data 
comprised o f observations from the forty-eight continental states from 1950-1987. Their 
regression model consists o f six explanatory variables: (i) the percentage change in the 
share of population living on farms from 1950 to 1987; (ii) an interaction term formed by 
multiplying a dummy variable for former slave states times the percentage change in the
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share o f population living on farms from 1950 to 1987; (iii) an interaction term formed 
by multiplying a dummy variable for former non-slave states times the percentage change 
in the share of population living on tenant and sharecropper farms from 1950 to 1987;
(iv) the percentage change in college graduates from 1950 to 1987; (v) the percentage 
change in median years o f school completed from 1950 to 1987; (vi) the unemployment 
rate in 1987, and (vii) an interaction term formed by multiplying a dummy variable for 
former slave states times the 1950-1987 percentage change in the share o f the black 
population.
Crown and Wheat (1995) conclude that changes in education and the farm-urban 
mix are the two strongest factors underlying changes in per capita income. They argue 
that a primary cause of income convergence is the collapse of sharecropping in the 
Southern states.
Becsi (1996V Like Crown and Wheat (1995), Becsi (1996) focuses on the 
phenomenal growth of the southern states. At issue is the role that state and local taxes 
may have contributed to this growth. According to Becsi (1996), taxes raise the costs and 
lower the returns of taxed activities. This creates incentives for individuals and 
businesses to engage in activities that are taxed at lower rates. The result is inefficient 
resource allocations and, ultimately, lower economic growth. Like Mullen and Williams
(1994), Becsi (1996) argues that marginal tax rates are more important than average tax 
rates in affecting behavior, and hence, growth.
Becsi’s dependent variable is the difference in average, annual growth rates of per 
capita personal income (PCPI) between the state and the nation (1961-1992). He 
employs two tax variables: (i) relative marginal tax rate, and (ii) a measure o f relative tax
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progressivity (a kind of balanced budget condition). The one non-tax variable is the 
initial, relative PCPI. As discussed above, the initial PCPI is included to capture 
convergence effects in the data. Becsi’s data consist of cross-sectional observations from 
all fifty states where data are averaged for the 1961-1992 period and initial PCPI is from 
1960.
Becsi (1996) concludes that relative marginal tax rates are negatively and 
significantly related to relative state economic growth over the period 1961 to 1992. This 
suggests that economic policies that lower marginal taxes rates may result in increased 
long-term economic growth.
Chemick (1997). Chernick (1997) focuses on the relationship between state and 
local tax incidence and economic growth. He explains that the crucial determinant of tax 
incidence is the relationship between (i) the level of income and (ii) the demand for the 
public goods and service. The lower the income elasticity of demand for public goods 
and services, the less progressive the tax system. The greater the progressivity o f a 
state’s tax system, the greater the likelihood that mobile factors will migrate out of that 
state. According to this argument, increased tax progressivity will be negatively related 
to economic growth.
Chemick (1997) employs a cross-sectional time series dataset o f forty-seven 
states (Hawaii, Alaska and Wyoming are excluded) from 1977 to 1997. The dependent 
variable is the growth rate in real PCPI measured over three separate time periods: 1977- 
1985, 1985-1989, and 1991-1993. The tax variables consist of (i) tax burden and (ii) a 
measure o f tax progressivity. The nontax variables consist of: (i) initial relative PCPI in 
1977; (ii) a measure of Aid to Families with Dependent Children Program (AFDC)
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benefits; (iii) the percentage of the population that is black; (iv) the percentage o f the 
population that is young; (v) the percentage of the population that is elderly; (vi) the 
percentage of the labor force that is unionized; (vii) regional dummy variables (South, 
West, and North Central); and (viii) time period dummy variables (for 1985-1989 and 
1991-1993).
The estimated results indicate that all tax variables employed have insignificant 
effects on the growth rate o f real PCPI. Tax progressivity has a negative coefficient 
estimate while tax burden has a positive coefficient estimate. Chernick argues that one 
possible explanation for the insignificance o f the tax variables is that inefficient tax 
structures respond to poor economic performance rapidly enough to prevent an 
observable effect on the economic base. Another possible reason is that tax structure is 
not responsive to changes in the tax base, at least in the short run period.
Yamarik 120001. Yamarik (2000) examines the effect of state tax policy on state 
economic growth using cross-sectional observations from forty-eight, continental states 
from 1977 to 1995. He distinguishes taxes paid on income, consumption and property: 
“the effects o f taxation are disentangled by estimating disaggregate personal income, 
general sales and property tax rates” (p. 212). Yamarik predicts that higher income tax 
rates and property tax rates decrease the growth rate of employment, investment, and 
income. In contrast, he does not expect consumption or sales tax rates to affect growth, 
because it does not affect the return of capital like income and property taxation.
Yamarik (2000) employs the following dependent variables: (i) the average 
growth rate in Gross State Product (GSP); (ii) the average growth rate in GSP per worker 
(average productivity); (iii) the average growth rate in the labor quantity; and (iv) the
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average ratio or real investment to GSP. Tax variables consist of: (i) average tax rate with 
respect to GSP, (ii) average tax rate with respect to property, (iii) marginal tax rate with 
respect to GSP, (iv) marginal tax rate with respect to personal income, and (v) marginal 
tax rate with respect to general sales. For the control variables, Yamarik includes initial 
GSP per worker and the percentage of the population having college degrees.
Yamarik (2000) obtains mixed results with respect to the tax variables. The 
marginal tax rate with respect to GSP is estimated to have a positive coefficient in the 
GSP regression, but a negative coefficient when the dependent variable is the ratio of 
investment to GSP. On the other hand, the average tax rate enters negatively in both 
regressions. In contrast, the disaggregated tax rates are generally consistent with 
Yamarik’s predictions. Accordingly, Yamarik (2000) concludes that disaggregated tax 
rates provide a better measure of tax distortions.
II.2. Country-Level Empirical Growth Studies
Grier and Tullock (1989) Grier and Tullock (1989) investigate various hypotheses 
about economic growth. They hypothesize that economic growth is determined by 
following variables. The first variable is initial conditions; from any starting point, 
countries that are behind in technology will grow faster relative to more advanced 
countries, due to diminishing returns to investment in a given technology. The second 
variable is population growth: labor force growth is hypothesized to have a direct effect 
on income growth. The third variable is inflation. Phillips curve models imply a 
permanent trade off between inflation and output; hence they predict a positive sign on 
inflation. On the other hand, anticipated inflation reduces capital accumulation and 
growth. In developing countries, inflation is often triggered by political crises that
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depress growth. This implies a negative coefficient on inflation. The fourth variable is 
variability in inflation. Previous studies have found that the variability of inflation is 
negatively correlated with GNP growth. Grier and Tullock (1989) measure the change in 
inflation by the sample standard deviation of inflation. The fifth variable is variability in 
income growth. Greater variability in income leads to higher savings, implying a positive 
relationship between income variance and economic growth. The last variable is size of 
government. Grier and Tullock (1989) hypothesize that a one-time change in government 
intervention will permanently change economic growth. Grier and Tullock (1989) 
construct their sample from two different groups of countries: the twenty-four members 
o f the Organization for Economic Development and Cooperation (OECD), and eighty- 
nine countries from the rest o f the world (ROW).
Grier and Tullock (1989) estimate three major differences between the two groups 
of countries: (i) In the OECD, the negative sign o f initial per capita income confirms the 
convergence hypothesis. In the ROW, the positive sign o f initial per capita income 
implies that richer countries grow faster than poorer countries, (ii) The standard 
deviation o f population growth in OECD countries is smaller than one in ROW countries, 
(iii) Average inflation has no effect on the growth rates o f OECD countries, but is 
negatively and significantly related to growth in the ROW. Government growth has a 
negative effect on economic growth in both samples.
Grier and Tullock (1989) employ a cross-sectional time series dataset of 
observations from 24 OECD countries and 89 ROW countries from 1951 to 1980. They 
average their data so that single observations consist of five-year averages. Their full
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sample consists of 500 observations. The data used in Grier and Tullock’s study come 
from Summer and Heston dataset or Penn World Tables^
Koester and Kormendi 11989) Koester and Kormendi (1989) examine the impact 
of average and marginal tax rates on the level and the growth of economic activity. The 
study is motivated by supply-side hypotheses that predict that higher rates o f taxation will 
inhibit economic activity and/or economic growth. Koester and Kormendi (1989) use 
two dependent variables in their regression model: (i) the growth rate in real GDP (1970- 
1979); and (ii) the level o f per capita GDP (1980). Both average and marginal tax rates 
are included as explanatory variables, along with initial per capita GDP.
Koester and Kormendi (1989) estimate that marginal tax rates negatively and 
significantly affect the level of per capita GDP. The authors employ cross-sectional 
observations of sixty-three countries using averaged data from 1970 through 1979. Data 
on GDP, tax revenue and average tax rates come from the World Bank, World 
Development Reports, 1982.
Levine and Renelt 11992). Levine and Renelt (1992) use extreme-bounds analysis 
(EBA)^ to test the robustness of coefficient estimates to alterations in the conditioning set 
of information. Accordingly, they provide evidence on the sensitivity o f past studies to 
small alterations in the explanatory variables commonly used in growth studies.
Dependent variables used by Levine and Renelt (1992) are (i) the average annual 
growth rate of real per capita GDP (1960-1989), and (ii) the investment share (1960- 
1989). The explanatory variables consist o f fifty-two variables measuring economic.
 ̂The Table contains data on 30 variables for about 150 countries over the years 1950-92. It is built up 
through a set o f  sophisticated extrapolations from the successive benchmark studies, both through time and 
across space.
® Also see Learner (1983) for detail explanation o f this method.
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political, and institutional factors. Included among fiscal policy variables are a wide 
variety of tax and expenditure variables, including the ratio of individual income tax 
receipts to GDP. They find that very few economic variables are robustly correlated with 
cross country growth rates or the ratio of investment expenditure to GDP.
Levine and Renelt (1992) use data from 119 countries from 1960 to 1989. Data 
come primarily from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. In addition, 
data from previous studies are also used to assess the reliability of the results.
Easterlv and Rebelo ( 1993). The main focus of Easterly and Rebelo’s study 
(1993) is to test the effect of fiscal policy variables on economic growth. They use 
standard data sources combined with newly created data for public investment. The 
neoclassical theory of endogenous growth provides the theoretical framework for their 
study.
The growth rate of real per capita GDP (1970-1988) is the dependent variable.
Tax variables include various average and marginal tax rates. Non-tax variables include: 
(i) initial per capita GDP; (ii) initial primary enrollment; (iii) initial secondary 
enrollment; (iv) assassinations per million; (v) revolutions and coups; and (vi) war 
casualties per capita. Since data on cross country marginal tax rates are not observable, 
Easterly and Rebelo compute marginal income tax rates using four approaches: statutory 
tax rates, a fraction of revenue to GDP, income-weighted marginal tax, and regression 
results from regressing revenue from each type of tax on GDP.
Easterly and Rebelo (1993) conclude that the evidence for whether tax rates 
matter for economic growth is fragile. On the other hand, there is strong evidence that 
income affects tax rates. This evidence follows “Wagner’s Law,” which states that
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government expenditure is endogenous to economic development; as development 
proceeds there will be a long-run tendency for the public sector to grow relative to 
national incom e/
Easterly and Rebelo (1993) use cross-sectional data consisting of observations 
from 105 countries over the period 1970-1988. They also utilize a cross-sectional, time 
series dataset consisting of 28 Latin American and OECD countries from 1870 thi'ough 
1988. Data come primarily from the World Bank, Government Financial Statistics.
Engen and Skinner (1996T Engen and Skinner (1996) review existing studies on 
taxation and economic growth in order to estimate the growth impact o f a major reform 
of the tax system in the U.S. They first examine the historical record o f the U.S. 
economy for evidence of tax cut effects on economic growth. In the second step, they 
consider the evidence from large samples o f countries. Finally, they evaluate the evidence 
from micro level studies of labor supply, investment demand, and productivity growth. 
Engen and Skinner’s study does not undertake any original estimation work.
Engen and Skirmer (1996) make a number of useful points. First, it reviews the 
major arguments relating taxation to economic growth. Second, it lists the econometric 
shortcomings o f many studies. In particular it notes the problem o i ""reverse causality” 
saying that " ... .reverse causality is really the Achilles’ heel of the typical cross-country 
regression. Nearly every variable on the right-hand side of the regression is suspect.” (p. 
630). Third, it estimates the following tax effect: a five percentage point decrease in 
marginal tax rates is estimated to increase annual growth by 0.28 percentage points in the 
short run and 0.22 percentage points in the long run. Finally, the composition o f the tax
’ The long-run tendency is caused by many factors such as a substitution o f public for private sector 
activity, an increase in cultural and welfare expenditures by the state, and government intervention to 
manage and finance natural monopolies.
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system is important. Countries with a more efficient tax administrative and enforcement 
system will be more likely to enjoy faster economic growth.
Sala-i-Martin 11997). Sala-i-Martin argue that the extreme bounds analysis (EBA) 
utilized by Levine and Renelt (1992) is a harsh criterion to determine the robustness of 
variables. He estimates two million regressions in order to have a better determination of 
variables’ robustness. Sala-i-Martin (1997) studies the robustness of 59 variables, 
including variables that represent monetary policy, political policies, and institutional 
indicators. Data for all variables employed in Sala-i-Martin’s study are taken from the 
World Bank Research Department’s website.
The results o f the study by Sala-i-Martin (1997) show that 22 out of the 59 
variables tested appear to be significantly related to economic growth. In contrast, the 
EBA criterion leads to the determination that only one variable coefficient is significant 
and robust. In comparing these two results, Sala-i-Martin concludes: “the picture 
emerging from the empirical growth literature is not the pessimistic, ‘nothing is robust’ 
result obtained with extreme bound analysis. Instead, a substantial number of variables 
can be found to be strongly related to growth” (p. 182).
Mendoza. Milesi-Feretti. and Asea (1997L The main point of a study by 
Mendoza, Milesi-Feretti, and Asea (1997) is to test the effect o f tax policy on economic 
growth. The authors base their empirical model on endogenous growth theory, which is 
driven by the accumulation o f factors o f production (human and physical capital) and 
“Constant Return to Scale” technologies.
Mendoza, Milesi-Feretti, and Asea (1997) use the growth rate of per capita real 
GDP for their dependent variable. Tax variables include: (i) the GDP share of
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government purchases which can be interpreted as an overall tax rate; (ii) the tax rate on 
labor; (iii) the tax rate on consumption; and (iv) the tax rate on personal income. The 
nontax variables consist of the following: (i) initial per capita real GDP; (ii) private 
investment rate; (iii) changes in “terms of trade”; (iv) secondary school enrollments; and
(v) time effect dummies.
Mendoza, Milesi-Feretti, and Asea (1997) find that taxes have negligible growth 
effects. There is no evidence that tax rates affect the income growth in the long run. In 
contrast, there is some evidence that taxes have transitional effects that disappear over 
time. They also recognize the importance o f correcting for the endogeneity of tax rates 
with respect to income.
Mendoza, Milesi-Feretti, and Asea (1997) employ cross-sectional and time series 
data consisting o f observations of eighteen OECD countries from 1966 until 1990. Using 
five-year averaging procedures, they obtain a total o f ninety observations. Data comes 
primarily from OECD, Revenue Statistics (1990) and National Accounts: Volume 11, 
Detailed Tables (1991).
Temple 11999). Temple (1999) reviews recent empirical studies of economic 
growth. He identifies five topics of concern. The first is “Parameter heterogeneity”: 
Empirical studies on economic growth generally lump together coimtries that differ 
widely on social, political, and institutional dimensions. This problem is likely to be 
more severe in cross-sectional studies. The second is “Model uncertainty”: Levine and 
Renelt (1992) have shown that coefficient results are not robust to alternative variable 
specifications. The third is “Endogeneity”: To avoid simultaneity, many researches 
often make use o f initial values and omit important variables from the model. The fourth
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is “Error correlation and regional spillovers”: The disturbances in cross-section growth 
regressions may not be independently distributed. To fix this problem, many researchers 
often use regional dummies to add to the explanatory power. However, the inclusion of 
regional dummies does not address random error correlations. The last is problems 
inherent in cross-sectional and time series data: Business cycle effects confront 
researchers with difficult choices when selecting time intervals to study growth. The 
relative advantages of annual data, five-year averages, or ten-year averages are not well 
understood. Despite these problems, the use of panel data approaches, together with tests 
for parameter heterogeneity, can successfully address many of the objections raised to 
cross-sectional empirical studies.
Kneller. Bleanev. and Gemmell (19991 Kneller, Bleaney, and Gemmel (1999) 
test the effect of fiscal policy on economic growth. For the dependent variable, the 
authors use per capita growth in GDP. Nontax variables include: (i) initial per capita 
GDP; (ii) investment; (iii) labor force growth; (iv) productive expenditures; (v) other 
revenues; (vi) other expenditures; (vii) “lending minus repayments”; (viii) budget 
surplus; (ix) country dummies; and (x) time dummies.
Kneller, Bleaney, and Gemmell (1999) find that tax coefficients have a 
significantly strong negative impact on economic growth. They also report evidence that 
fiscal policy has effects that last longer than five years. They address a number of 
econometric concerns. However, they find that their results are robust to the endogeneity 
problem, sample selection, and regression specification.
Kneller, Bleaney, and Gemmel (1999) use a cross-sectional, time series dataset 
consisting of twenty-two OECD countries from 1970 to 1995. Data are averaged over
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five-year periods to produce a total of 110 observations. Fiscal variables are collected 
from the IMF, Government Financial Statistics Yearbook. Annual data on real per capita 
GDP, investment rate, and labor force are taken from the World Bank CDROM.
Padovani and Galli (2001). Padovani and Galli (2001) test the effect of tax rates 
on cross-country economic growth. The authors attempt to improve on Koester and 
Kormendi (1989), Levine and Renelt (1992), and Grier and Tullock (1989) by producing 
longer time series of marginal tax rates and including a level and a slope dummy to 
capture the effects of tax reforms on tax rates. Padovani and Galli (2001) also check the 
robustness of their estimates using extreme bound analysis (EBA).
Padovani and Galli (2001) use the growth rate in GDP as their dependent variable. 
Explanatory tax variables consist of the marginal tax rate and the government 
consumption share of GDP (as a measure of the average tax rate). Nontax control 
variables include: (i) initial GDP; (ii) population growth; (iii) investment in physical 
capital; (iv) educational attainment; (v) mean of inflation; and (vi) terms o f trade. There 
are no time effect and country effect dummy variables in the model.
Padovani and Galli (2001) estimate that increased marginal tax rates are 
associated with lower economic growth. This result appears robust to change in model 
specification. Their sample is a cross-sectional and time series dataset consisting of 
twenty-three OECD countries from 1951 to 1990. Using ten-year averaging, they obtain 
a total o f ninety-two observations.
Foelster and Henrekson (20011. Foelster and Henrekson (2001) restrict their 
analysis o f taxes and economic growth to rich countries. They argue that rich countries 
share many unobserved characteristics that non-rich countries do not possess.
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Accordingly, including of non-rich countries results in omitted variable bias that distorts 
the estimation of tax effects. For their sample, the authors select twenty-three OECD 
countries from 1970 to 1995. The authors engage in extensive robustness testing, 
including Leamer’s EBA.
The authors use the growth rate in per capita GDP for their dependent variable. 
The tax variable is average tax rate, measured by total taxes as a share of GDP. The 
nontax variables consist of: (i) initial per capita GDP; (ii) investment as a share of GDP; 
(iii) growth rate of the labor force; (iv) growth rate of average years of schooling; (v) 
country dummies; and (vi) time dummies. They average data over five-year periods.
Foelster and Henrekson (2001) conclude that taxes are negatively and 
significantly related to economic growth. This finding is found to be robust with respect 
to sample selection. The result is maintained even when the sample is extended to 
include non-OECD countries.
Bleanev and Nishivama (2002). Bleaney and Nishiyama (2002) have as their 
ambitious goal to develop the “best” empirical model of economic growth and establish a 
benchmark model. They start the analysis by comparing models from previous studies. 
They are motivated by criticisms of extreme bounds analysis (EBA). EBA is shown to 
underestimate coefficient robustness. It rejects too many variables as fragile, even when 
they are part of the true data-generating process.
Bleaney and Nishiyama (2002) include twenty-six variables in their empirical 
analysis. Their sample consists of observations from 138 countries from 1965 to 1990. 
Changes in human capital, institutions, specialization in primary products, and terms of
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trade are estimated to be important determinants of growth. They also report evidence of 
significant nonlinearity in the relationship between initial income levels and growth.
II.3. What Can We Learn from This Literature Review?
Surprisingly, there are relatively few studies of the effect of taxes on state 
economic growth that employ cross-sectional time series analysis. Of the state-level 
studies surveyed above, only Helms (1985), Quan and Helms (1987), and Chernick 
(1997) use cross-sectional time series analysis. Further, of these three, only Helms 
(1985) uses a continuous time series and has a broad coverage of states. However, none 
of these studies use the five-year cross sectional, time series approach that Grier and 
Tullock (1989) pioneered in their study of cross-country growth differences, which has 
become so popular nowadays. Five-year averaging has the advantage of netting out short­
lived shocks that can spuriously generate correlations in the data, and disguise true 
correlations.
International growth studies that estimate the effect of taxes while employing 
cross-sectional, time series data are: (i) Grier and Tullock (1989)—if one counts the 
variable “mean growth of government share o f GDP” as a tax variable; (ii) Mendoza, 
Milesi-Feretti, and Asea (1997); (iii) Kneller, Bleaney, and Gemmel (1999); (iv) Bleaney, 
Gemmel, and Kneller (2001); (v) Padovano and Galli (2001); and (vi) Foelster and 
Henrekson (2001).
Tax variables in the state level studies are shown to have ambiguous effects on the 
economic growth. Romans and Subrahmanyam (1979) show that business tax rate has a 
significantly positive effect on economic growth while tax progressivity has a 
significantly negative effect. Chemick also finds that Tax progressivity has a negative
36
effect. In contrast, he estimates a positive coefficient sign for tax burden though it is 
significant in only some of the regressions. Table 2.1 summarizes the estimated effects of 
tax variables on income growth in the state level studies.
On the other hand, tax variables in international level studies are generally shown 
to have a negative effect on economic growth, as seen in Table 2.2. Mendoza, Milesi- 
Feretti, and Asea (1997) show that all taxes except consumption taxes have negative and 
significant effects on economic grovrth. Distortionary taxes have a negative effect on 
growth while non-distortionary taxes have a positive but insignificant effect according to 
Kneller, Bleaney, and GemmeTs studies (1999 and 2001). It is worth noting that only 
international studies (iii), (iv), and (v) use country and time dummies to obtain better 
estimate results on taxes effects.
There is considerable concern with the endogeneity problem: Easterly and 
Rebelo (1993) argue that fiscal policy is free from the endogeneity problem when they 
control income by adding aid revenue for all countries. Additionally, they argue that, in 
the long run, population level is more responsible for variations in fiscal structure; hence 
the endogeneity problem can be avoided if one controls for population levels. Mendoza, 
Milesi-Feretti, and Asea (1997) and Bleaney, Gemmel, and Kneller (2001) use 
instrumental variable techniques to address endogeneity in their model. Temple (1999) 
reviews previous approaches to the endogeneity problem and concludes that none are 
likely to eliminate the problem.
Among state and country-level growth studies, Foelster and Henrekson (2001) 
and Padovano and Galli (2001) are the only two that correct for the fact that observations 
may not be independent and identically distributed {iid). Temple (1999) notes that
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disturbances in cross section growth studies using regional dummies may not also be iid 
because o f the possibility of spatial correlation in the disturbances. Efforts to adjust for 
spatial correlation can raise formidable statistical problems. Temple concludes that the 
standard error in most cross-section growth studies regressions “should be treated with a 
certain degree of mistrust” (p. 131).
A number of studies recognize a potential lack of robustness in their estimates. 
Levine and Renelt (1997) find that almost all results from existing studies are not robust. 
Sala-I-Martin (1997) attempts to use a “less-extreme test” (compared to the extreme 
bound analysis (EBA) of Levine and Renelt) by running 2 million regressions in order to 
assign some level of confidence to each o f the variables used in the existing growth 
studies. Sala-I-Martin finds that, contrary to EBA analyses, there are many variables that 
are robustly related to growth. Kneller, Bleaney and Gemmel (1999), Foelster and 
Henrekson (2001), and Bleaney and Nishiyama (2002) investigate and test the robustness 
o f their estimation results, most frequently using extreme bound analysis (EBA). All 
these studies find cases o f non-robustness in some of the variables. Again, Temple 
(1999) has critiques: He notes tests of robustness have their own problems, including but 
not limited to endogeneity and measurement errors. Moreover, Temple emphasizes that 
the EBA tests and the like pay too much attention to statistical significance, and not 
enough to the real economic problems the studies are designed to address.
Bleaney, Gemmel, and Kneller (2001) claim that government fiscal effects may 
have both short- and long run effects. The authors do Wald tests to find the appropriate 
lag length of fiscal variables. They find evidence that fiscal effects last eight years.
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Previous studies identify at least five different ways that taxes might affect 
economic growth. The first is that higher taxes on corporate and individual income can 
discourage investment. Second, taxes may reduce labor supply growth by discouraging 
labor force participation. Third, tax policy may attenuate research and development 
(R&D) and development of “high-tech” industries. Fourth, tax policies can influence the 
marginal productivity of capital by encouraging businesses to move from heavily-taxed 
sectors with high level of productivity to lesser-taxed sectors with lower productivity. 
Finally, heavy taxation on labor supply will discourage workers from working in sectors 
with high social productivity. With lower labor and capital productivity, economic 
growth will be diminished.
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Table II. 1: The Effects of Fiscal/Tax Variables on Economic Growth: States’ Studies
States’ Studies Fiscal/Tax Variable Sign Significant
Romans and • Tax Progressivity - Yes
Subrahmanyam (1979) • Personal income tax rate + No
• Business tax rate + Yes
Dye (1980) • Total tax burdens + Sometimes
• Income tax burden + No
• Sales tax burden +/- No
• Business tax rates - No
• Workers’ income taxes - No
• Executive income taxes No
Helms (1985) • Property tax - Sometimes
• Other taxes - Sometimes
Canto & Webb (1987) • Change in state relative to 
national tax burden
- Yes
Quan and Beck (1987) • Current state relative to 
national tax burden
• Lagged state relative to national
+ Sometimes
tax burden + Sometimes
Vedder (1990) • Change in state and local tax 
burden
- Yes
Yu, Wallace, and Nardinelli • Tax burden +/- Sometimes
Mullen and Williams • Average tax rates - No
(1994) • Marginal tax rate - Yes
Becsi (1995) • Relative marginal tax rate - Yes
• Relative tax progressivity - Sometimes
Chemick (1997) • Tax burden + Sometimes
• Tax progressivity - Sometimes
Yamarik (2000) •  Tax burden with respect to GSP
•  Tax burden with respect to
- Sometimes
property 
•  marginal tax rate with respect ■
Yes
to GSP
• marginal tax rate with respect
+/- Sometimes
to personal income 
• marginal tax rate with respect
Sometimes
to general sales 4-/- Sometimes
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Table II.2: The Effects of Fiscal/Tax Variables on Economic Growth: Countries’ Studies
Countries’ Studies Fiscal/Tax Variable Sign Significant
Grier and Tullock (1989) # Mean growth of 
government share of 
GDP
Yes
Mendoza, Milesi-Feretti, and e Tax on Consumption + Yes
A sea(1997) # Tax on Labor 
Income
Yes
# Tax on Capital 
Income '
No
# The ratio of 
Individual Income 
Tax Revenue to 
GDP
No
Kneller, Bleaney, and Gemmel # Distortionary Tax - Yes
(1999) • N on-Distortionary 
Tax
+ No





Padovano and Galli (2001) • Marginal Tax Rate - Yes
Foelster and Henrekson (2001) # Tax burden with 
respect to GDP
- Yes






GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE EM PIRICAL APPROACH
This chapter describes my empirical approach for examining the effect of taxation 
on state economic growth. I first discuss the general specification of the including the 
dependent and explanatory variables employed in the model. Then, I move on to briefly 
discuss the econometric issues associated with estimating the model. Finally, I discuss 
my step-by step estimation plans, starting from ordinary least squares with dummy 
variables to the two-stage least squares with panel-corrected standard errors.
III.l. Model of Economic Growth and Taxation
My empirical work will estimate the following model of taxation and economic 
growth, using a cross-sectional, time series data set of 45 states with eight observations 
per state from 1964 to 1999:
k
= Ys,t -  Ys,,-j = Po+ PiYs.t-j + PiYYTRsj + ̂ sTRs.i-j + + Ms + î + Ss.i
i=4
where s = 1,2,..., 48; t = 1964, 1969, 1974,..., 1999; andJ = 4.
The dependent variable is change in the log of state real personal income (AYs,t), which is 
what most of the literature uses to measure economic growth. The lagged value o f log 
real personal income at the beginning of the five year period (Tj,/.y) is included as an 
explanatory variable because o f neoclassical growth theory. When applied to states, this 
theory predicts that states will “converge” to the same steady state growth path. The 
states that are furthest from their steady states w ill grow the fastest. The implication is 
that, ceteris paribus, states with lower initial personal income levels will grow faster than 
ones with higher initial personal income levels.
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The next explanatory variables are the Change in Tax Rates during the five-year 
period {ATRs.i) and the value of state tax rates at the beginning o f the five-year period- 
Initial Tax Rates {TRsj.j). Tax rate in this study is referred to as “Tax Burden” and is 
defined as the percentage of the level of state and local taxes to state personal income. An 
unresolved question in the taxes and economic growth literature is: Is it the change in tax 
rates or the level of tax rates that affects economic growth? While most empirical 
taxation and growth studies use the level of taxes, some important studies use changes in 
tax rates in their analyses (Vedder, 1990; Grier and Tullock, 1989). For this study, both 
the changes in tax rates and the level of tax rates are included; however, the level variable 
used is the value of state tax rates at the beginning of the five-year period (TR^j-j). The 
use of the initial levels follows for all the explanatory variables, except the change in tax 
rates (ATRsj) which is contemporaneous. Statistically, the use o f the initial levels is 
designed to avoid potential problems with endogeneity in the model o f this study.
Other explanatory variables ÇX’s.i-j) are used to control for other factors that rriay 
explain state growth rates. Neoclassical growth theory allows the possibility that states 
may have different steady-state growth rates. I rely on the empirical literature for 
guidance in the selection o f variables. These variables are also employed as control 
variables* to rule out alternative explanations of economic growth; also included are the 
variables that have been found important in previous research. They will be entered with 
their initial values or values at the beginning o f the respective five-year periods.
State fixed effects (ps) are included in the model to capture the influence of 
omitted variables containing substantially state-specific characteristics. These omitted
In general, control variables include any plausible alternative cause or influence. In statistical terms, 
control variables are variables one would like to hold constant so one can examine the effect of some 
particular independent variables.
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variables may explain state growth rates and may be correlated with the tax variables. 
Another reason of including the state fixed effects in the growth model is also to capture 
the noise of endogenous growth theory^ in which a state has its own specific 
characteristics such as technological factors that will allow this state to have a different 
growth and economic path from other states. Finally, time fixed effects (A,) are included 
to capture national shocks that affect state personal income due to secular growth, 
business cycles, population trends, federal and fiscal policies, etc. Correlations between 
movements in these tax rates and national shocks to state personal income could generate 
spurious correlation between tax rates and state personal income if the national shock 
effects on personal income are not controlled.
III.2. Econometric Issues
The specification of the model above raises immediate concerns about the 
endogeneity of the Change in Tax Rates during the five-year period {ATRs,t). In 
particular, there is concern that states may raise (lower) taxes during times o f recession 
(growth). If this is the case, then causation would run from the dependent variable to the 
explanatory variable, resulting in inconsistent estimates of tax effects. This concern with 
endogeneity is common in economic growth studies. Engen and Skinner (1996) write:
“ .. .reverse causality is really the Achilles’ heel o f the typical [growth] regression. Nearly 
every variable on the right-hand side of the regression is suspect” (p. 630). I take two 
measures to circumvent the endogeneity problem in the model.
 ̂The endogenous growth theory (Romer, 1994) differs from a “Solow Growth” model (exogenous growth 
theory) primarily in the lack of diminishing returns to capital. Technology is no longer assumed to be 
exogenous to the economy and the growth process. This assumption leads to the debates about what drives 
technological change and whether it contributes to convergence or not.
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First, I use two-stage least squares (2LS) to address problems of endogeneity with 
the Change in Tax Rate variable. I employ political representation variables such as 
ADA (American for Democrat Action) scores, and strength of Democratic and 
Republican Party variables as instrumental variables. These instruments are expected to 
be correlated with tax rates but uncorrelated with economic growth. I will check the 
suitability of my instrumental variables by (i) using an F-test to check for the joint 
significance of the political variables in the first-stage regression (cf. Bound, Jaeger, and 
Baker; 1995); (ii) using a Hausman test to test (over-identifying restrictions) for the 
exogeneity of the instruments (cf. Caselli, Esquivel, and Lefort; 1996); and (iii) conduct a 
Bollen test'® to check whether the instruments which over-identify the model are valid in 
the general model specification.
The second way to deal with endogeneity is using initial values for all non-tax 
explanatory variables. Initial values are the values at the beginning o f the respective five- 
year period. The use o f initial values for explanatory variables will eliminate the problem 
caused by endogeneity for these particular variables.
Another econometric issue is non-spherical error terms in the model of economic 
growth and taxation. If one relaxes the assumption that Var(e) =(TI„ and assumes that 
Var(g) = Z, where Z is a general symmetric positive definite matrix, the result is the case 
of non-spherical error terms or disturbances. Consequently, the ordinary least squares 
(OLS) estimators are still unbiased but are no longer BLUE, and efficiency is lost. 
Possible sources o f the non-spherical error terms in the econometric model are: (i) serial 
correlation; (ii); group-wise heteroskedasticity and (iii) cross-sectional correlation.
'® Bollen (1996) proposes this as a test o f whether the general model specification and the instruments are 
valid. It is similar to a chi-squared test for overall significance. The test checks whether the extra variables 
that over-identify the model are valid for the specification
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Serial correlation (also called autocorrelation) is the correlation o f a variable with 
itself over successive time intervals. This problem occurs mostly in time-series data.
Serial correlation will not affect the unbiasedness or consistency of OLS estimators, but it 
will affect their efficiency. With positive serial correlation, the OLS estimates o f the 
standard errors will be below the true standard errors. This leads to the conclusion that 
the parameter estimates are more precise than they really are.
The reason to have group-wise heteroscedasticity in the model of economic 
growth and taxation is that states differ from one to another. For example, states 
dependent on volatile industries like high tech manufacturing, agriculture, or tourism, 
may not have higher average economic growth than other states, but will have greater 
volatility in their economic growth. The group-wise heteroscedasticity is easily 
incorporated and moreover, amenable to feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) 
estimation.
Another error structure issue is cross-sectional correlation. State economies may 
be linked either due to geographical proximity, or because inputs and outputs from 
different states may be complements or substitutes. This generates correlation between 
the state economies. This correlation (called cross-sectional correlation) is a problem for 
the estimation of the model of economic growth and taxation. The standard errors from 
OLS estimation will be inconsistent. Unfortunately, the usual prescription for this 
problem, feasible GLS estimation (FGLS), carmot be applied in my study because the 
number of time periods observations in my sample is less than the number o f cross- 
sections observations {t < s). In this case, the corresponding covariance matrix is not full 
rank, rendering FGLS inapplicable. Accordingly, I use the method of Beck and Katz
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(1995), which is the method of panel corrected standard error (PCSE), to adjust for cross- 
sectional correlation. This method uses OLS to generate coefficient estimates, but uses 
the estimated covariance matrix to calculate standard errors. The Monte Carlo work of 
Beck and Katz (1995) found that this approach produced relatively low mean squares 
error (MSB) estimates, while generating reliable standard error estimates.
III.3. Estimation Plan
The samples for this study consist of a cross sectional/time series dataset on 45 
states (Alaska, Hawaii, Nebraska, Minnesota, and Wyoming are excluded). Like many 
other studies, I exclude Alaska and Hawaii because their economies are so different than 
the continental states. Nebraska and Minnesota are excluded from the analysis because 
of missing information in political party variables; political party variables are needed as 
instrumental variables to perform 2SLS based estimation methods. Wyoming is omitted 
because it is the only continental state whose state tax rate is heavily dependent on 
severance taxes: During the late 1970s and 1980s when the state experienced an oil 
boom and bust, Wyoming’s calculated tax rate changed dramatically in response to 
rising/falling severance taxes.
The sample period commence with data from 1960, the initial year for which I 
could obtain a complete and consistent series o f all variables. The sample period ends 
with data from 1999, the most recent year for which all data are available.
My sample contains eight time periods: (1) 1960-1964, (2) 1965-1969, (3) 1970- 
1974, (4) 1975-1979, (5) 1980-1984, (6) 1985-1989, (7) 1990-1994, and (8) 1995-1999. 
With 45 states, the total number o f observations is 360. I assume the conditions of serial
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correlation, group-wise heteroskedasticity, and cross-sectional correlation in the model of 
economic growth and taxation.
The following paragraphs present verbal descriptions, along with a discussion of 
the advantages and disadvantages o f the estimator methods employed in the model of 
economic growth and taxation analysis. These paragraphs also show the abbreviations 
that will be used to refer to these estimators in the remainder of the paper.
Ordinarv Least Squares (OLS)
The first step of estimation in this study is model estimation using ordinary least 
squares with dummy variables. This is nothing more than conventional OLS with state 
and time dummy variables included {pis ’ s and 1 /s). It is worth noting that OLS is 
optimal for cross-sectional and time series models if the errors are spherical. In other 
words, it is important to assume that all the error processes in cross-sectional and time 
series models is homoscedastic, and also free from the problem of autocorrelation and 
cross-sectional correlation. The assumptions o f homoscedasticity and spherical errors are 
too strong to be applied in the cross-sectional and time series models like the model of 
economic growth and taxation in this study. Beck and Katz (1995) write: “Most analysts, 
however, are not willing to accept the assumption of spherical errors for time series and 
cross-sectional models” (p. 636).
Ordinarv Least Squares with Heteroscedastic Consistent Standard Errors lOLS-HCSE) 
The second step is to estimate the model using Ordinary Least Squaress (OLS), 
but with robust standard errors (White standard errors). This relaxes the assumption of 
homoscedasticity. Trying to transform the data to correct heteroskedasticity can lead to 
problems if the assumption of the exact form of heteroskedasticity turns out to be wrong.
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In this case, it may be better to accept the (inefficient) OLS coefficient estimates, but 
calculate consistent standard errors (given the maintained assumption of 
heteroskedasticity).
Ordinary Least Squares with Panel-Corrected Standard Errors (OLS-PCSE)
To address the full complexity of the error structure assumed to exist in my data
set, I estimate the model using OLS with panel-corrected standard errors pioneered by
Beck and Katz (1995). Beck and Katz (1995) show {via Monte Carlo experiments) that
the efficiency gains from cross-sectional correlation correction are typically small, while
standard-error bias is relatively large. Accordingly, Beck and Katz (1995) suggest
estimating standard errors according to a robust procedure that incorporates potential
cross-sectional correlation information into the coefficient variance-covariance matrix
without adjusting the coefficient estimate.
Beck and Katz (1995) show that this procedure (Panel-Corrected Standard-Errors
or PCSE) produces more accurate standard errors compared to OLS by stating:
. ...in the case of homoscedasticity and contemporaneously independent errors, 
where OLS standard errors are accurate, PCSEs performed exactly, as well as the 
OLS standard errors. But (as expected) as the errors became less spherical, the 
performance of the OLS standard errors declined. Thus PCSEs dominate OLS 
standard errors; when PCSEs are not necessary, they perform as well as the OLS 
standard errors, and when OLS standard errors perform poorly, PCSEs still 
perform well. (p. 641)
They also show that PCSE has admirable small sample properties relative to other
alternatives in the OLS estimation.
The main drawback from the PCSE approach is that the corresponding OLS
estimates are inefficient. Further, OLS is subject to endogeneity bias if  the explanatory
variables are correlated with the error term.
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Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS)
As explained earlier, there is good reason to suspect that my model of economic 
growth and taxation suffers from endogeneity bias. One technique to address this 
problem is two-stage least squaress (2SLS). The suspected endogenous variable is the 
Change in Tax Rate. As instruments, I will use the political representation variables, 
along with a variety of economic and demographic variables measured at the beginning 
of the respective five-year period. It is hypothesized that these instrumental variables are 
strongly correlated with the change in state tax rates but exogenous or uncorrelated with 
economic growth. The first hypothesis can be tested with an F-test for joint significance 
of the instruments in the first stage of 2SLS. The second hypothesis will be tested with 
Bollen testThe major disadvantage is that 2SLS assumes spherical errors, as in 
conventional OLS, which results in inefficient coefficient estimates.
Two-Stage Least Squares with Panel-Corrected Standard Errors ('2SLS-PCSEI
Finally, I will estimate the model using 2SLS with panel-corrected standard errors 
from Beck and Katz (1995). The problem of endogeneity in the explanatory variables 
suspected to be endogenous in the model is appropriately handled by the 2SLS method. 
With proper exogenous instrumental variables, 2SLS will produce consistent coefficient 
estimates. Furthermore, the PCSE will handle serial correlation and cross-sectional 
correlation in the error terms. The result will be consistent estimates o f standard errors. 
The main disadvantage o f this approach is that the coefficient estimates, since they are 
unweighted, will be inefficient.
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CHAPTER IV
DETERMINANTS OF STATE TAX RATES
IV. 1. Introduction
This chapter investigates the factors that determine changes in state tax rates. 
There are two motivations for doing this. First, I want to identify variables that can serve 
as instruments for changes in state tax rates. Second, this will allow me to address 
endogeneity concerns about state tax policy by incorporating 2SLS estimation in my 
analysis o f state economic growth.
Besley and Case (2000) suggest that greater use should be made of political 
variables as instruments in empirical studies o f state’s policies. The empirical work in 
this chapter follows up this suggestion. Thus, the second motivation is to identify new 
political variables that may prove valuable as instruments in other studies. This chapter 
proceeds as follows. Subchapter IV.2 summarizes previous studies that have examined 
the determinants of state fiscal policy. Particular emphasis will be given to the role of 
political variables. Subchapter IV.3 identifies the (i) demographic and (ii) political 
variables that are significantly related to state policy variables. Subchapter IV.4 and IV.5 
estimate the determinants of changes in state tax rates. Subchapter IV.6 concludes.
IV.2. Summary of Previous Studies of the Determinants of State Fiscal Policy
Poterba (1994T Poterba (1994) examines the factors that determine how states 
respond to fiscal crises in the short-run. Fiscal crises have greater force at the state level 
because deficit finance is prohibited in most US states. Once a state has a fiscal crisis, 
politicians are confronted with a dilemma; to raise taxes or reduce outlays to restore fiscal 
balance.
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The core analysis in Poterba (1994) consists of two regression models. One 
model has the change in real state expenditures per capita as the dependent variable; the 
other uses the change in real per capita state taxes. Both models use the following 
independent variables: unexpected deficit shock; a dummy variable that measures 
whether governor and the majority party o f the lower house of legislature are from the 
same party; a dummy variable that measures whether a gubernatorial election is 
imminent; and various state fiscal institutions.
Poterba’s findings suggest that states react to unexpected deficit shocks with real 
changes in fiscal position. Raising taxes within the fiscal year has a small contribution to 
deficit reduction, but raising taxes that take effect in the next fiscal year is a better option 
than cutting spending to correct unexpected deficits. With respect to political variables, 
Poterba (1994) estimates that states with a single-party government raise more taxes and 
cut more spendings in response to unexpected deficit shocks. He provides two 
interpretations for this finding; (i) reaching political consensus in single-party states is 
easier than that in divided-party state governments; and (ii) the governor and the state 
legislature are more politically vulnerable in the states with a divided-party government. 
Unpopular actions such as raising taxes or cutting spending will be a threat for control of 
legislative seats in the next election. Poterba also explores the effect of the governor’s 
position in the electoral cycle to the magnitude o f tax increases and spending cuts. The 
indicator for this variable equals unity in fiscal years immediately prior to gubernatorial 
elections. With a 10 percent level of confidence, his paper suggests that spending cuts 
and tax increases are significantly smaller when the governors are up for reelection.
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Various state fiscal institutions include the following variables; the weakness in 
state anti-deficit rules, the existence of state tax limitation rules, and the level of the 
general fund balance. The reason for utilizing these variables is the fact that there are 
significant institutional differences across states. The estimates show that the states with 
weak anti-deficit rules adjust spending less in response to positive deficit shocks than 
those with strict rules. The states with tax limitation rules increase fewer taxes when they 
face deficit shocks than those with no tax limits. In contrast, there is not enough evidence 
that spending cuts are adjusted differently in states with tax and expenditure limits 
compared to those without such limits. The findings of this paper show that states with 
low expected general fund balances cut spending by a larger amount in response to 
positive deficit shocks.
The major drawback o f Poterba is that the results are based on a narrow time 
period. Poterba employs a cross-sectional/time series data set from 1988 through 1992 for 
states with annual budget cycles. In total, the sample in this paper consists of only 131 
observations from 27 continental states over a period of five fiscal years. This study notes 
that data for budget cuts from the National Association o f State Budget Officers 
(NASBO) are only available beginning with the mid-1980s and additionally, the 
information on tax increases has only been collected since 1988.
Alt and Lowrv ( 1994T Alt and Lowry (1994) examine whether state fiscal and 
political institutions affect the level of state spending and taxing rules. Using a formal 
model of fiscal policy where the state’s revenue equals the state’s expenditure, the paper 
concludes that (i) Democrats set state spending at a higher percentage of state personal 
income than Republicans; and (ii) states with divided governments have smaller
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responses to budget deficits than states with unified governments. Two dependent 
variables are employed in the empirical analysis: state real per capita revenues and state 
real per capita spending. Their paper includes 14 independent variables. These variables 
are broken into two categories: (i) demographic and economic variables and (ii) political 
variables. The demographic and economic variables consist of lagged real per capita 
revenues (in the revenue equation), current real per capita revenues (in the spending 
equation), real per capita state income (in the revenue equation), real per capita federal 
contributions (in the revenue equation), unemployment rate (in the spending equation), 
and lagged real per capita surplus. The political variables consist of a series of dummy 
variables, which include a dummy variable for Republican governors in non-southern 
states, a dummy variable for unified Republican government, a dummy variable for 
unified Democrat government, a dummy variable for split branch, a dummy variable for 
split legislature, a dummy variable for southern region, a dummy variable indicating 
whether the state has constitutional prohibition in carrying over a budget deficit into the 
subsequent fiscal year, and state level dummies.
The data for revenue, spending, federal contributions, personal income, and the 
unemployment rate cover the 48 states, (excluding Hawaii and Alaska) from fiscal years 
1968 through 1987. All o f these variables (except the unemployment rate) are based on 
real value, 1982-1984 per capita dollar figures and are obtained from the Census 
Bureau’s State Government Finances (selected years), several issues of Statistical 
Abstracts and The Book o f  the States. For dummy variables, Nebraska is omitted for all 
years because it has a non-partisan or unicameral legislature. Minnesota is also excluded 
from 1968 to 1972 for the same reason as Nebraska while Maine is omitted from 1975 to
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1978 because it had an independent governor. The total dataset is 931 state-years where 
631 of them are non-southern states.
A shortcoming of the Alt and Lowry ( 1994) study is that the data set is 
decomposed into a number of sub-samples. For example, the 931 “state-year” 
observations are divided into eight separate samples of (i) (Nonsouthern) Unified 
Republican state government with deficit carryover restrictions; (ii) (Nonsouthem) 
Unified Republican state government with no deficit carryover restrictions; (iii) 
(Nonsouthem) Unified Democratic state government with deficit carryover restrictions; 
(iv) (Nonsouthem) Unified Democratic state government with no deficit carryover 
restrictions; (v) Split branch state government; (vi) Split legislature state government;
(vii) Southern Unified Democratic government; and (viii) Southem Split branch state 
govemment.”  The breakup of the total sample into these eight sub-samples precludes the 
use of state and time fixed effects. This method could produce better results o f the effect 
of state fiscal and political institutions on taxes if  these sub-samples have different 
stmctural relationships but there would not be a general conclusion whether political 
institutions affect the level of spending and taxing.
Beslev and Case (AER. 1995). Besley and Case, (AER, 1995) examine whether a 
state’s tax-setting behavior is affected by the tax-setting behavior of neighboring states. 
This study makes assumptions that voters have fairly open information across the states 
and they are able to make comparisons between jurisdictions to overcome political 
agency problems. Another assumption is that there is “asymmetric information” between 
voters and politicians: voters know less about the cost o f providing public good than
’ ‘ Alt and Lowery (1994) identify “Southem” states as Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, 
Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North and South Carolina, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and 
West Virginia.
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politicians. There are two types of politicians: rent seekers who charge more than the cost 
of public goods and non-rent seekers who provide public goods and services at cost.
Voters choose to reelect the incumbents by evaluating the incumbents’ 
performances and comparing them to neighboring states’ incumbents’ performances. If 
voters are skeptical about the need to increase a tax, even a small increase may force 
elected officials to lose their seats. However, if  voters find that taxes are increasing 
everywhere, voters will not mind an increase in taxes, even with a large increase. These 
assumptions lead incumbents into yardstick competition in which they care about what 
incumbents in neighboring political jurisdictions are doing for the tax-setting policy.
Besley and Case (AER, 1995) use a two-year change in tax liability as the 
dependent variable in their model. Two types of tax liability are employed: personal 
income tax liability, and sales and corporate income tax liability. There are three groups 
of independent variables employed in this study. The first group is state economic 
indicator variables that measure incumbents’ performance: (i) a two-year change in state 
income per capita; and (ii) a two-year change in state unemployment rate. The second 
group is the economic indicators that reflect neighboring incumbents’ performance plus 
their tax-setting policy: (i) a two-year change in neighboring states’ income per capita;
(ii) a two-year change in neighboring states’ unemployment rate; and (iii) a two-year 
change in neighboring states’ tax liability. Besley and Case find that not all of the 
economic indicators significantly affect the probability of governor reelection. Since 
neighboring states’ unemployment rate estimates have an insignificant coefficient and 
neighboring states' income appears to have a weak influence on reelection probabilities, 
the results show little evidence that voters measure their governor’s performance in this
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way. However, the results suggest that voters are very sensitive to tax changes relative to 
the ones they observe in neighboring states, and this leads to votes against an incumbent 
whose tax changes are relatively high in regional standards.
The last group of independent variables is state demographic variables plus the 
governor's age; this group contains: (i) a two-year change in the state proportion of the 
young population (aged 5 to 17 years old); (ii) a two-year change in the state proportion 
of the elderly (aged 65 and above); and (iii) the governor’s age. The estimated 
coefficients of the state demographic variables show that change in sales, income and 
corporate taxes increase with an increase in the proportion of elderly and young within 
the population. The proportion of young appears to be more significant than the 
proportion of elderly. This study also includes state and year dummy variables to absorb 
the impact of changes in national economic conditions and changes in federal fiscal 
behavior.
Using a cross-sectional/time-series approach, the dataset for the equation with 
personal income tax liability as the dependent variable only covers the period from 1979 
through 1988 in 48 states (Alaska and Hawaii are excluded). This is because the data are 
only available within this period at the National Bureau o f Economic Research (NBER). 
On the other hand, the equation that employs sales and corporate taxes as the dependent 
variable covers a longer period, from 1962-1988 since the data source from the Census 
Bureau’s Statistical Abstract is more complete and comprehensive.
A shortcoming o f the Besley and Case (AER, 1995) study is that there are 
relatively few explanatory variables to explain changes in state taxes, though the study 
does employ state and time fixed effects. If changes in state taxes affect economic
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performance, then there are endogeneity problems in the use of state income per capita 
and state unemployment rate as explanatory variables. Further, the explanatory variables 
(i) two-year change in the proportion young (aged 5-17) and (ii) two-year change in the 
proportion elderly (aged 65+) are by necessity plagued with measurement error problems 
since this data is only available at ten-year intervals from the U.S. Census.
Beslev and Case 10JE, 1995). Another study by Besley and Case (QJE. 1995) 
examines whether governors in their last term behave differently with respect to taxing 
and spending behavior. The authors used a reputation-building model of political 
behavior to analyze the issue. Their argument is that governors facing a binding term 
limit behave differently compared to those who are able to run for reelection. This fact 
provides a source of variation in discount rates that can be used to test a political agency 
model.
Besley and Case start with the assumption of asymmetric information about the 
types of politicians. Voters judge and gauge the types of their incumbents’ performances 
by using the outcome measures from incumbents. If incumbents want to be reelected, 
then the possibility of reelection will affect policy choices. Officials try to develop a 
reputation that enhances their reelection chances.
As indicators of policy choices in the model, seven variables are employed as 
dependent variables. They are as follows: (i) sales tax per capita; (ii) income tax per 
capita; (iii) corporate tax per capita; (iv) total taxes per capita; (v) state spending per 
capita; (vi) minimum wage; and (vii) maximum weekly benefit for temporary total 
disability. This study uses seven explanatory variables: state income per capita, the 
proportion of young (aged 5-17), the proportion o f elderly (aged 65 and above), state
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population, a dummy variable of whether a Democrat incumbent is in his/her last term, a 
dummy variable of whether a Republican incumbent is in his/her last term, and finally, 
state and year effect dummies to absorb the changes in national economic conditions and 
federal fiscal and political changes.
The results of this study show that when a governor faces term limits, sales taxes 
per capita as well as income taxes will be higher in his/her final term than if he/she did 
not face the term limit. However, corporate taxes appear to be insignificantly affected.
For the insignificant estimates on corporate taxes, this study finds only weak positive 
results on total taxes. The proportion of young (aged 5-17) is a positive and significant 
determinant of sales taxes, income taxes, corporate taxes, and total taxes. The proportion 
o f elderly (aged 65 and above) is only a positive and significant determinant for sales 
taxes.
Results estimated by the model also suggest that term limits significantly affect 
state spending per capita, as do state demographic variables. State spending rises when 
the proportions of young increases while it falls with an increase in the proportion of 
elderly. Additionally, negative and significant effects of a binding term limit are observed 
on the real minimum wage policy while the effect of term limits on maximum weekly 
benefits appears to be positive but insignificant.
With respect to the effect o f political party effects, Besley and Case (QJE, 1995) 
estimate that if  the governor who faces the term limit is a Democrat, total per capita taxes 
and its components are higher by $10 to $15 on average. On the other hand. Republican 
governors in their last term reduce sales taxes, corporate taxes, and real minimum wage
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while raising income taxes and state spending per capita, though by a lesser amount than 
Democrats in their final terms of office.
The authors present this empirical study using cross sectional/time series data for 
48 states (excluding Alaska and Hawaii) from 1950 to 1986. Data on the variables are 
taken from the Census Bureau’s Statistical Abstract o f  the United States, Compendium o f  
State Governments, and The Book o f  States. Other data sources are Monthly Labor 
Review and the Report o f  the Minimum Wage Study Commission, published by the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics.
A shortcoming of the Besley and Case (QJE, 1995) study is that it attributes all 
changes in state fiscal policy to the governor of that state. Information about the 
strengths of the political parties in the state legislature is omitted. Further, the main state 
demographic variables (proportion elderly and young) are used in the annual time series, 
cross-sectional analysis, despite the fact that this data is only available at ten-year 
intervals from the U.S. Census.
Poterba (1997). Poterba (1997) studies the impact of “demographic structure”, 
particularly the proportion o f a state’s population that is elderly, on state education 
spending. This focus of the paper is motivated by the tension between family with 
children who mostly receive the return from tax-financed public education spending, and 
older households with owner-occupied homes who pay taxes that finance K-12 education. 
This generational difference is believed to lead to a tension in the political process in 
which educational budgets are set.
The dependent variables employed in this paper are per capita non-education 
direct spending and per child school-spending. Both of them are in logarithmic values.
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The reason for including per capita non-education direct spending is to help estimate a 
“control specification” that may provide evidence of spurious relationships. Estimating 
the model with this variable as a dependent variable provide evidence on the effect of 
demographic and other variables on differences in public spending and/or allocative 
effects with respect to education and other programs.
There are two groups of explanatory variables in the empirical model of this 
paper: (i) state economic variables that include the logarithm of real per capita personal 
income and the logarithm of real federal aid to K-12 education; and (ii) state 
demographic variables, comprised by the logarithm of the proportion of school age 
children (aged 5-17) in the population, the logarithm of the proportion o f elderly (aged 65 
and over) in the population, the logarithm of the fraction of population who own homes, 
are non-white, live in urban areas, and live below the poverty line. To absorb the changes 
in national economic conditions and other changes in omitted variables, state and year 
dummies are also included.
The fraction o f the young and the elderly in the population significantly affect 
per-child spending on education. With state and year dummies included, the proportion of 
elderly has a negative relationship. The results suggest that, other things being equal, 
states with more elderly voters spend less on public schools. Comparing this result to the 
one estimated by “control equation” in which the dependent variable is per capita non­
education direct spending also strengthens this finding. The estimates o f the “control 
equation” suggest that a larger fraction o f the elderly in a state leads to a higher spending 
on non-education programs.
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Poterba (1997) also finds that the percentage of school-age children significantly 
affects per capita education spending in a positive way. Further, the “control equation” 
supports this finding by implying that an increase in the young population reduces the 
state and local government spending per capita but raises the share of such spending that 
flows to education.
The estimated effects of real personal income per capita and the fraction of 
population that own homes, are non-white, live in an urban area, and live below the 
poverty line, and receive Federal aid are briefly described. The relationship between real 
personal income per capita and per-child spending on education is positive but not 
significant, as well as the relationship between the fraction of population that lives below 
poverty line and per-child education spending. The higher the fraction of homeowners in 
the state, the more the state will spend on per-child education. This may be viewed as the 
result o f the fact that homeowners face a lower marginal tax price of public spending. 
However, the non-white fraction of the population gives a weak predictive power for per- 
child education spending. Additionally, the proportions o f the population who live in an 
urban area negatively and significantly affect the level o f per-child education spending.
Poterba (1997) measures all data variables in logarithm, and the data covers 48 
continental states, every ten years, from 1960 to 1991, by applying the panel data 
approach. Monetary values from the dataset are reported in 1992-dollar value using 
national income and product accounts deflator for government purchase of goods and 
services. Data on state demographic variables are obtained from the US Census Bureau, 
and the US Census o f  Population and Housing Report. Several issues of the Economic 
Report o f  the President provide information about state economic variables. A
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shortcoming of the Poterba (1997) study is that it does not include any political party 
variables. Further, the study ignores endogeneity concerns caused by feedback effects 
from state spending decisions to state personal income.
Crain and Crain 119981. Crain and Crain (1998) investigate whether “current 
service budget baselines” increase state spending policy. A current service budget 
baseline sets the default level of public spending at the amount necessary to maintain 
existing services. This is in contrast to a “dollar budget baseline” in which the current 
level of expenditures is used as the baseline. Current service is widely criticized as 
biased toward higher spending in the existing budget process.
Crain and Crain use the growth in real spending per capita and the level of per 
capita spending as dependent variables in their two regression models. Their study 
employs 11 independent variables as follows: (i) a dummy variable to indicate whether 
the state uses a current service budget baseline procedure; (ii) personal income per capita;
(iii) the population share under 18 years; (iv) a dummy variable to indicate whether the 
state has a constitutional balanced budget requirement; (v) “State Federalism Structure,” 
a variable that measures the degree of centralized responsibility in government 
administration within the state; (vi) “Tax Revenue Structure,” a variable that measures 
the share o f state taxes revenues raised from individual income taxes; (vii) the proportion 
o f the population who live in urban areas; (viii) a dummy variable to indicate whether the 
state has a 4-year term limit on governorship; (ix) “Party Stability” in the state Senate,. 
an index that measures the probability that the same party retains majority control of the 
state Senate; (x) “Party Stability” in state House of Representatives, an index to measure 
the probability that the same party retains majority control of the state House of
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Representatives; and (xi) a set of regional dummies to control for the potential effects of 
region-specific factors that are either unobservable or omitted from the model.
The estimated coefficients show that during the 1980s, a current service baseline 
procedure had a positive and significant coefficient on spending growth. The current 
service baseline procedure led to higher spending than the dollar budget baseline 
procedure. The results also suggest that spending growth rates are significantly higher in 
states with 4-year terms limit on governance, as compared to states with only 2-year 
terms limits. The coefficient o f “Party Stability” index for state Senates appears to be 
significant: more predictability in the continued majority control by the same party 
promotes higher spending growth. However, the “Party Stability” index for the state 
House of Representatives fails to have a significant effect on state per capita spending 
growth. By examining the estimated coefficients of the fiscal structure variables, I can 
see that states that concentrate greater fiscal responsibility at the state level had higher 
spending growth than those that concentrate greater fiscal responsibility at the local level. 
A heavier dependence on income tax than other state revenue sources results in higher 
state per capita spending growth. States that have no requirement on the Constitutional 
Budget Balance have significantly lower state per capita spending than those that have a 
requirement. Finally, state spending moves in a positive direction with personal income 
and the share of the young population but moves negatively with the share of the 
populations who live in urban areas.
Crain and Crain (1998) use a cross-sectional dataset o f 47 states (excluding 
Alaska, Delaware, and Nebraska) and cover 10 years of observations, from 1980 through 
1990. State per capita spending is in constant 1988 dollars. Most of the economic and
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demographic variables are obtained from the publication of the US Department of 
Commerce, the US Bureau of Economic Analysis, and the US Census Bureau.
Meanwhile, the US Council of State Governments Book o f States, biennial editions, and 
the US Census Bureau State Government Finance, annual editions are the main source of 
political variables. A shortcoming of Crain and Crain (1998) is the narrow time-frame of 
the study, 1980-1990. A further shortcoming is the fact that there is no role for party 
affiliation variables in the empirical analysis.
Vedder (1990). The last study reviewed in this chapter is a work by Vedder 
(1990). I saved this study for last because it comes closest to the analysis that I will 
undertake in this chapter. Although Vedder is primarily concerned with the effect of 
state taxes on economic growth,'^ he includes an analysis of the effect o f political 
structure variables on the change in state tax rates. This is the only study that directly 
studies the determinants of changes in state tax rates.
Vedder uses a cross-sectional dataset of 48 continental states plus the District of 
Columbia with the dependent variable being the change in the aggregate state and local 
tax rate from 1967 to 1987, as measured by tax revenues per $ 1,000 of personal income. 
The explanatory variables included are: (i) the tax rate in the initial year 1967; (ii) the 
state’s 1967 per capita income level; (iii) an indicator of the conservativeness o f a state, 
as measured by the average percentage o f people voting for the Republican candidate in 
the 1976 and 1988 presidential elections; (iv) the average aggregate tax rate in 1967 of all 
states bordering on the state in question; and (v) the change from 1967 to 1987 in the
'■ I have discussed and reviewed this study in chapter two with more detail descriptions. This study is 
considered to be the only one that uses the term o f the change in state tax rates as dependent variable.
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aggregate tax rate in the bordering states. It is clear that only economic and political 
variables were employed in the equation.
Vedder (1990) finds evidence that the states more likely to vote for Republican 
candidates also had significantly lower taxes. While Vedder (1990) does find a 
significant link between party affiliation and changes in state tax rates, his study is 
limited by a number of shortcomings. The inclusion of the District of Columbia is 
arguable. The regression analysis does not include any demographic characteristics of 
the states. Further, a great deal of information is thrown away in collapsing the data 
down to a cross-sectional sample. There is no doubt that state tax rates have had periods 
of substantial increase and decline over the 1967 to 1987 period.
IV.3. Implication of Previous Studies for Variable Selection
Previous studies suggest that both demographic and political variables may be 
important explanatory variables for changes in state tax rates. Tables IV. 1 and IV.2 
summarize the findings of previous studies with respect to the estimated effects of 
demographic and political variables. Columns (l)-(3) identify the study, the dependent 
variable, and the respective explanatory variables. Column (4) reports the estimated 
effects o f the variables on taxes or expenditures. Column (5) reports the significance of 
the estimated coefficients.
****TABLE IV. 1 HERE****
State demographic variables. What can we learn from previous studies with 
respect to the selection of demographic variables? As Table IV. 1 reports, demographic 
variables are frequently found to have significant coefficients in state taxes and/or state 
expenditures regressions. The coefficients of the unemployment rate, the proportion of
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the population aged 5-17 years old, the proportion of the population aged 65 and above, 
total population, the fraction of the population who own homes, and the fraction of the 
population who live in urban areas are all significant in some specifications. 
Unfortunately, there is little consistency. For example, while both Besley and Case 
studies find that the proportion of the population aged 5-17 years old is positively related 
to higher taxes, Poterba (1997) finds that this same variable is negatively related to 
school spending, and negatively (but insignificantly) related to non-school state spending.
****TABLE IV.2 HERE****
Political variables. A similar conclusion holds with respect to previous studies’ 
findings on the effects of political variables. Table IV.2 reports that the following 
political variables are detenninants of state taxes and/or spending with significant 
coefficients; control of the governorship and the lower house of the state legislature by 
the same party; an imminent gubernatorial election; the governor’s age; a Democratic 
governor; a Democratic governor in his/her last term; a large share of state and local 
revenues; a gubernatorial term limit; a 4-year gubernatorial term limit; “party stability” in 
the state senate; and “party stability” in the state house.
As before, however, these findings generally lack consistency. For example, it 
seems contradictory that “party stability” in the state senate should be associated with 
higher spending, while “party stability” in the state house is associated with lower 
spending. The finding that comes closest to being a consistent finding in the literature is 
that party affiliation variables matter. Generally, a state which is characterized by a 
greater degree of “Democratic-ness” is likely to have higher taxes and spending than a 
state which is more Republican in nature. Nevertheless, even this finding is complicated
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by the fact that “Democratic-ness/Republican-ness” is measured in different ways by 
different studies.
In conclusion, while previous studies do not establish strong priors about the 
expected effects, they do establish the fact that demographic and political variables can 
be significant determinants of state tax policy. Amongst demographic variables, the (i) 
proportion of the population aged 5-17 years old, (ii) the proportion of the population 
aged 65 and above, and (iii) the fraction of the population who live in urban areas appear 
to be particularly important.'^ Amongst political variables, the findings of previous 
studies suggest that party affiliation variables should be included in analyses of state 
fiscal policy.
IV.4. Empirical Analysis of the Determinants of Changes in State Tax Rates
General Description of Study and Variables
As mentioned earlier, the objective of this chapter is to identify the empirical 
determinants of the change in state tax rate. Moreover, 1 try to identify instruments for the 
change in state tax rate that can be used in 2SLS estimation of state growth rates. My 
sample consist of a cross sectional/time series dataset on 45 states (Alaska, Hawaii, 
Nebraska, Minnesota, and Wyoming are excluded) from 1960 to 1999. Nebraska is 
excluded from the analysis because of missing information in political party variables 
(Nebraska has a non-partisan, or the unicameral system, in the state legislature). 
Minnesota is also excluded since it had a unicameral system in the state legislature from 
1959 through 1970, and Wyoming is omitted because its state tax rate is heavily
While the unemployment rate is also frequently a significant determinant of state taxes and/or 
expenditures, I choose not to include this variable in the empirical analysis below because of the concern 
with endogeneity.
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dependent on severance taxes, which caused it to change dramatically in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s when the state experienced oil booms, as shown by Figure IV. 1.
Figure IV.1 State and Local Tax Burden of Wyoming (1961-1995)______
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Source: State and Local Tax Burden Information compiled by Prof. W. Robert. 
Reed and Prof. Cynthia L. Rogers, The University of Oklahoma. (http://faculty- 
staffou.edu/R/Cynthia.Rogers-l/TAX/WY_TB6096.htm)
Due to relatively little year-to-year variation in most o f the variables, especially 
the change in state tax rate, I analyze the data using 5-year intervals. This is also to avoid 
the problem of data unavailability and further, to overcome the problem of “wipe out” 
and “fiscal cycle” effects mentioned in the study by Beasley and Case, QJE (1995). 
Consequently, this study has data for eight time periods for the total of 360 observations: 
(1) 1960-1964, (2) 1965-1969, (3) 1970-1974, (4) 1975-1979, (5) 1980-1984, (6) 1985- 
1989, (7) 1990-1994, and (8) 1995-1999.
All variables in the tax rate change equation, except the political variables, take 
their values at the beginning of the period. By doing this, the problem of endogeneity is
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minimized. The dependent variable employed is the change in state tax rate {Change in 
Tax Rate). The value of this variable is calculated as the difference between the state tax 
rate in year t and the rate in the previous 5 years {t-4). State tax rate is commonly referred 
to as “Tax Burden” and is defined as the percentage of the level of state and local taxes to 
the state personal income. Since tax calculations involve fiscal years and personal income 
is based on calendar years, tax rates are calculated by dividing state and local taxes in 
period t by state personal income in period t-1. The smallest change in state tax rate 
during my 5-year interval observations appeared in North Dakota from 1970 to 1074 in 
which state tax rates decrease by 3.814 percentage points. While Wisconsin had the 
highest change in state tax rates by increasing 2.120 percentage points from 1960 to 
1964. The earliest data (1950's until 1980’s) for state and local taxes is downloaded from 
the US Census Bureau homepage. I hand-entered the latest data (1990’s) from the US 
Census Bureau Government Finance (selected years). In the next two sub chapters, I will 
describe two groups of the independent variables; economic and demographic variables 
and political variables based on the descriptive statistics in Table IV.3.
***TABLE IV.3 HERE****
Economic and Demographic Variables
State tax rates at the beginning of the period {Initial Tax Rate) is included as a 
determinant o f tax rates changes since I expect that competition among states encourages 
tax rate convergence. Beasley and Case (AER, 1995) argue that “yardstick competition” 
forces the incumbents to reduce the tax-burden close to their neighboring states’ tax rate. 
Accordingly, I expect the sign of this variable to be negative. In my sample, Virginia was 
the state that had the lowest tax burden. In 1960, 7.15 percent o f its real state personal
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income was burdened by state and local taxes. On the other hand, New York had the 
highest tax rate in 1970 with 15.85 percent.
Data on the percentage of the elderly aged 65 and above at the beginning of 
period {Elderly) are collected from the US Census Bureau Statistical Abstract o f  the 
United States (selected years) and its homepage. The percentage of the elderly (aged 65 
and above) was not available for 1961 through 1964, but I overcame this data 
unavailability problem by using 5-year interval data instead of yearly observations, as 
mentioned earlier. During the time periods I observed, the average of the percentage of 
the elderly in the US was 10.7 percent; the lowest percentage of elderly was in Nevada in 
1965 at 5.2 percent. The highest percentage o f elderly was 18.2 percent in Arkansas in 
1990.
Data on population density at the beginning of the period {Density) and its 
components, total population and land area, is loaded from the homepage o f the US 
Census Bureau. In the annual observations, the state with the highest population density 
was New Jersey in 1999 with 1,046 persons per square mile. And the lowest population 
density was Nevada in 1964 with 4 persons per square mile.
The last demographic variable included is education attainment at the beginning 
of the period {Education), which is defined as the fraction of the population aged 25 
years old and above who completed college or a higher degree program. Data on this 
variable was only available for the years 1960, 1970,1980,1990,1995, and 1999 in the 
US Census Bureau Statistical Abstract o f  the United States. The SAS “expand”
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procedure''* was utilized to impute values for the missing years. The state with the lowest 
fraction of person 25 years old and above who completed a college or higher degree 
program was Illinois in 1964, with only 4.22 percent. In contrast, 31.67 percent of 
Colorado’s population 25 years old and above completed college or higher degrees in 
1999.
Data of income earned in agricultural {Farm) and manufacturing 
{Manufacturing) sectors are calculated as the proportion of the state personal income at 
the beginning of period. Data on state agricultural and manufacturing income was loaded 
from the homepage of the US Bureau of Economic Analysis. On average, for all states in 
my time observations, farm income constituted only 3.84 percent of personal income. In 
1960, South Dakota had the highest percentage of annual farm income to personal 
income with 24.23 percent. On the other hand, the lowest value was North Dakota with 
-6.55 percent in 1980. During the time periods I observed, in 1965 Michigan had the 
highest concentration o f manufacturing with 36.55 percent of its state personal income 
coming from manufacturing.
The variables Elderly and Density are included because they were found to be 
significant in previous studies. The other demographic variables are included because 
they appear in the income growth equation as explanatory variables, and must be 
included in the tax rates change equation to perform the 2SLS analysis. However, one can
The “expand” procedure converts time series from one sampling interval or frequency to another and 
interpolates missing values in time series. With this procedure, ones can collapse time series data from 
higher frequency intervals to lower frequency intervals, or expand data from lower frequency intervals to 
higher frequency intervals. For example, quarterly estimates can be interpolated from an annual series, or 
quarterly values can be aggregated to produce an annual series.
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imagine that these variables may be measuring preferences for state spending and taxes 
policy amongst different special interests in the state.
Political Variables
The political variables employed as the determinants for the change in state tax 
rates are divided into two categories: political variables from the states’ federal 
legislature and ones from state’s state legislature. The political variables from federal 
legislature are generally approximated by only one variable, which is the adjusted mean 
o f the American for Democrat Action (ADA) score. A D A  Average in this study 
measures the mean ADA score for the state’s federal politicians (mean ADA score in 
House of Representatives plus mean ADA score in the US Senate divided by 2), over the 
5-year period. I employ the mean value over the five-year period lagged one year (t-5 to 
t-1 rather than t-4 to t) because legislative changes voted in one fiscal year typically do 
not go into effect until the next fiscal year. This variable is designed to measure the 
states’ federal legislators' preferences for spending and taxes.
At the federal level, a higher ADA score is generally associated with support for 
higher federal spending and taxes. 1 believe that voters who support federal legislators 
with higher ADA scores will also support state legislators who support higher spending 
and taxes. Thus, the prediction is that this variable will be positive. The adjusted ADA 
score data is loaded from the homepage of Tim Groseclose, a Political Science Professor 
of Stanford University.
This variable is commonly used as a measure o f how liberal or conservative a member of congress is in 
their office. Democrats are known more liberal than Republicans.
It is possible to have a negative number for ADA score since I use Real (Inflation-adjusted) ADA score 
produced by Groseclose, Levitt, and Snyder Jr. (1999) 
http://faculty-gsb.stanford.edu/groseclose/turboadas.webpage.update061302.xls
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According to this measure, the most liberal state was Massachusetts in 1979 with 
a mean ADA score of 85.44. In that year. Democrats controlled both the House of 
Representatives and the Senate in the Massachusetts’ federal legislature. On the other 
hand, Idaho was the most conservative state in 1984, with an average of only 1.89 real 
ADA scores, which was extremely conservative compared with other states in the same 
year. Again, I can also note that for Idaho, Republicans controlled both of the chambers 
in the federal legislature.
The second category is the political variables in the state’s state legislature. 
Democrat Legislature refers to the percentage of years during the 5-year period, in which 
that Democrat controlled both chambers in the state legislature, and Republican 
Legislature refers to the percentage o f years during the 5-year period, in which 
Republican controlled both chambers in the state legislature. Based upon the differences 
in spending and taxes preferences of Republicans and the Democrats at the federal level, 
my prediction is that Democrat Legislature will positively related, and Republican 
Legislature will be negatively related to changes in state tax rate. Only 20 out o f 45 states 
experienced a full 5-year unified Republican, while 33 states experienced a full 5-year 
unified Democrat during the time periods I observed. In fact, 12 states experienced a full 
40-years unified Democrat from 1959 through 1999. Of those states, 92 percent are 
southern states. There was only one state, New Hampshire, that was unified Republican 
for all observation years. The main data source of these political variables in the state 
legislature and their components is the US Census Bureau Statistical Abstract o f  the 
United States (selected years).'*
'* The reason of not including governor as political variable in my study is statistical. I do not find that 
governor showing significant coefficient in my preliminary tax model regressions in any specification
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Many state and time-specific factors have important effects on the tax rates 
change (such as unemployment rate, level of average wages, and the rise o f legislature- 
imposed special state spending and revenues). Those factors may affect the level of state 
income taxes and transfer payments; I need to recognize the potential influences of such 
effects by allowing for state and time-fixed effects in the equation. In this case. I try to 
identify the coefficients of interest from variation among states (over time) in other 
structures that cannot be explained by economy-wide shocks to demographics and 
political conditions. The inclusion o f the state and time-fixed effects in the equation also 
help me to avoid the problem of “specification bias” in the model.
IV.5. Empirical Results
In this section, 1 report the results o f regressing the change in state tax rate on 
state economic and demographic conditions and political variables. The first subsection 
reports the basic political specification results with the inclusion of cross-state fixed 
effects and time effects in the model, while the second, third, and fourth models add 
demographic and economic variables and also interaction variables among them. By 
interacting one specific variable to others, 1 will be able to alter their real impacts on state 
tax rates. Last two equations include the interaction variables between time fixed effects 
and demographic variables to analyze the robustness of the model.
Equation 1
1 begin the analysis with a model o f the change in state tax rate with political 
variables and Initial Tax Rate that controls for state and time fixed effects. The use of 
state and time fixed effect is intended to overcome the problem of bias from inadvertently 
omitting any variables that potentially affects both income growth equation and the
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change in state tax rates equation. Let the Change in Tax Rate be denoted by DTRst, the 
basic specification is;
DTRsi = Po + (3j Initial Tax Rate si +  /L  Republican_Legislaturesi
48
+ Ps DemocratJLegislaturest +!34ADA_Averages! +  ^
i=S
+ Pat + £s.t  (equation. 1)
/=49
The equation has a good fit, explaining approximately 46.5 percent o f the 
variation in the change in state tax rates. The state fixed and time fixed effects are jointly 
significant at a 0.01 level of significance in this equation.
The estimations shown in the first column of Table IV.4 indicate that the 
coefficient on Initial Tax Rate  is significant and has a negative sign, as expected. That 
initial levels of the state tax rate are negatively correlated with their changes reflects the 
process o f convergence in state tax rates. The point estimate suggests that, ceteris 
paribus, a state having a tax rate that is one percentage points higher than other states at 
the beginning of a 5-year period will increase its tax rate 0.47 percentage points less than 
other states over that period.
There are three political structure variables in this equation: adjusted mean ADA 
score (ADA Average), the percentage of years that Democrats controlled both of the 
chambers in the state legislature (Democrat Legislature), and the percentage of years that 
Republicans controlled the state legislature (Republican Legislature). As expected, the 
coefficient estimate o f ADA Average is positive; a higher ADA score in the federal 
legislature tends to increase state tax rates. Democrat Legislature and Republican 
Legislature also have the expected signs. States in which Republicans (Democrats) have
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controlled both houses of the legislature are less (more) likely to raise taxes during that 
period. However, neither of the associated coefficients is significant at the 5% level, and 
only Democratic Legislature is significant at the 10% level. However, a test of the null 
hypothesis that the political structure variables corporately have no effect on the change 
in state tax rates is rejected at the 5% significance level.
Equation 2
In consideration of public choice matters, I add 3 interactive variables: ADA 
Average x Farm, Republican Legislature xFarm, and Democratic Legislature x Farm 
to equation 1. The main reason for adding these interaction terms is statistical. The 
equation that includes Farm  interaction tem s has the lowest Akaike Information 
Criterion (AIC) and Schwartz Information Criterion (SIC).'^ Another reason is that it is 
well known that agricultural interests from farmer groups have a disproportionate impact 
on political outcomes in both federal and state legislatures. Regardless o f the very-small 
shares of farm income to total state earning, farmer groups are still important voters that 
help politicians to get elected or incumbents to get reelected. Historically, the Democratic 
Party drew its followers from farmer groups. In 2000, Democratic budget resolutions 
favored farmer groups by providing increases in income assistance for farmers. In 
contrast, additional money for agriculture was not a sure thing in the Republican budget 
resolution. However, these farmers’ political alignments have changed because the 
Republican platform released at the 2000 Republican Convention is more in line with 
agriculture. For example, the platform put fourth specific goals to repeal the inheritance 
tax, and to grant a one-time exemption on the capital gains tax from the sale of farming
AIC and SIC are commonly used in the issue o f model selection in Econometrics.
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products. Accordingly, the proportion of personal income earned from the agricultural 
sector (Farm) is interacted with the three political variables I have from equation 1.
The regression results of equation 2 reported in the third column of Table IV.4 
show a higher adjusted R', 0.395 compared to 0.369 in equation 2. This helps to indicate 
the joint significance of Farm  interaction terms. The formal testing also shows that Farm 
interaction terms’ coefficients are jointly significant with ap-value of 0.0008. With the 
inclusion of Farm  interaction variables into the equation, now I have a total of six 
political variables in the equation. The inclusion of Farm  interaction terms causes the 
coefficient oîADA Average  to become significant. A test that both of the ADA {ADA 
Average saxàADA Average  x Farm) coefficients are equal to zero is rejected with a p- 
value of 0.0064. The coefficient of Democrat Legislature and Republican Legislature 
remain insignificant but in spite of this insignificancy, I will still include them since a test 
of the null hypothesis that all o f the political variables’ coefficients (i.e., ADA Average, 
ADA Average x Farm, Republican Legislature, Republican Legislature x Farm, 
Democrat Legislature, anà Democratic Legislature x Farm) are jointly insignificant is 
rejected at 99 percent confidence level.
Due to the inclusion o f interaction terms in the equation, I need to calculate the 
estimates of marginal impacts o f the original political structures variables By employing 
a simple differential rule, I use the following formulas to gather the marginal impacts of 
the original political variables;
~  P A D A  _  Average P A D A  _ Average*FARM
P R e p a b lic a a _ Legislature P R e p u b lic a n _ Legislature*FARM
ÔADA __ Average 
dDTR
dRepublican _  Legislature
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P D < im o cra (  _  Legislclltire P D e m o c r a l  _ L eg isla n ire* F A K K !  4  jdDemocrat _ Legislature 
When evaluated at the mean value of Farm, the estimated marginal impacts for 
ADA Average, Democrat Legislature, and Republican Legislature are 0.0049, 0.0022, 
and -0.0023 respectively. These signs are consistent with what was expected and 
estimated in equation 1. However, none of these marginal impacts is significant at a 5% 
significance level when evaluated at the mean value of Farm.
Equation 3
Equation 3 adds the economic and demographic variables into equation 1.
DTRs, = Pi ADA_Averagest + Pi Democrat_Legislaturesi
+ Ps Democrat_Legislature St +P4  Initial Tax Rate si + Ps Elderlyst
5.1
+ p^ Density St + PjFarmst + PsManufacturingst + P9 Educatiousi V  Pip,
; = I 0
60
+ X! P»̂< +  (equation 3)
/=54
The equation explains approximately 51 percent of the variation in the change in state tax 
rates. The estimations shown in the third column of Table 1, again suggest that the 
coefficient on the Initial Tax Rate is significant and has a negative sign as expected. The 
positive and significant estimate o f the state’s population density at the beginning of 
period {Density) shows that states with higher population density are to be more likely to 
increase taxes than less densely populated states. The estimation results also suggest that 
all else equal, jurisdictions with more elderly populations are less likely to increase taxes 
than states with younger populations. Further, states whose economies that are more 
concentrated in the agricultural and manufacturing sectors, and whose populations are
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more educated, are individually estimated to be less likely to increase taxes than other 
states. The estimates of variable Farm, Manufacturing  and Education are all shown to 
be significant at a 5% level of significance. The significances of state characteristic 
variables is also supported by the hypothesis testing which rejects the null hypothesis that 
all of the State characteristic variables corporately have no effect on the change in state 
tax rates. The associated /7-value is 0.000002.
Again, the coefficient estimate of the political variables: ADA Average, Democrat 
Legislature, and Republican Legislature have the expected signs but insignificant 
coefficients. And, again, I reject the null hypothesis that all of the political structure 
variables jointly have no effect on the change in state tax rates (/7-value is 0.0294). 
Equation 4
Equation 4 adds the farm interaction effects to the specification of equation 3.
This equation has a higher adjusted R^, 0.437 compared to those in previous equations. 
This is consistent with the joint significance o f the Farm  interaction effects in the model. 
Formal testing also shows that the Farm  interaction terms’ coefficients are jointly 
significant with a /7-value of 0.0006. With the state characteristic variables in the 
equation, I find that the inclusion of the Farm  interaction terms together with state 
characteristic variables causes each of the coefficients of political structure variables, 
except Republican Legislature to become significant. A test that both of the ADA, both 
o f the Republican Party, and both of the Democratic Party coefficients are equal to zero, 
respectively is rejected with a /7-value ranging from 0.0013 to 0.011. Moreover, a test 
with a null hypothesis that all six political variables corporately have no effect on the 
change in state tax rates is rejected at the 95 percent level of confidence.
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Using the marginal impact formulas presented above, I find that the signs of 
marginal impacts of the political variables confirm my expectations. ADA Average  and 
Democrat Legislature have positive signs while Republican Legislature has a negative 
one. However, unlike the result from equation 2, the marginal impacts of the political 
variables when evaluated at the mean value of Farm  are significant at the 5% of 
significance level Democrat Legislature and 10% foi ADA Average.
Equation 5
Next, I try to check the robustness of the political variables estimates by exploring 
the effects of time specific differences among states. I include interaction variables 
between time fixed effect and state characteristic variables (Density, Farm, and 
Manufacturing) into equation 3. The reason for the inclusion o f time interaction 
variables is that states may differ from each other through time periods. For example, 
there were policies and regulations passed by Federal government on education, farm and 
manufacturing sectors throughout the observation periods. Those polices may induce 
different effects for state demographic variables over different time periods.
With 21 additional variables, the results of equation 5 show a higher adjusted R^, 
0.567 compared to previous equations. A test o f the null hypothesis that all time and state 
characteristic interaction terms have no effect on the change in state tax rates is rejected 
with a value of 0.0001. If I compare the results o f equation 5 to the results o f equation 
3 ,1 see that all variables consistently have the same estimated signs. I decide to select this 
equation as the better equation compared to previous equations because it has the lowest 
AIC and SIC, as shown in Table IV.4
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Equation 6
Having knowledge that equation 5 is the most appropriate model to select 
concerning the AIC and SIC scores, I finally include the Farm  and political variables 
interaction terms I have in equations 2 and 4 to analyze the robustness of the political 
variables’ effects on state tax rates. The result of this equation shows that about 70% of 
the variation in state tax rates can be explained by this model. A test of the null 
hypothesis that Farm  and the political variables interaction terms have no effect on the 
state tax rates is rejected with a /(-value of 0.06.
The results demonstrate the consistent sign estimates for all major variables. The 
point estimate of Initial Tax Rate  suggests that, ceteris paribus, a state having a tax rate 
that is one percentage point higher than other states at the beginning o f a 5-year period 
will increase its tax rate 0.49 percentage points less than other states over that period. All 
political variables but Republican Legislature have significant estimated signs as 
expected. When evaluated at the mean value of Farm, the estimated marginal impacts for 
ADA Average, Republican Legislature, and Democrat Legislature are 0.00578, 
-0.00285, and 0.00092, respectively. These signs are consistent with what was expected 
and estimated in equations 2 and 4. Even so, only the marginal impact o f Democrat 
Legislature is significant at the 5% significance level when evaluated at the mean value 
o f Farm. The marginal impacts of^ZM  Average  and Republican are significant only at 
the 10% significance level.
F. Implications and Discussion
Comparing and analyzing the estimates o f the six equations allow me to test 
whether there is any difference between the impacts of Republican legislatures and those
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of Democrats legislatures on the variability of the change in state tax rates. Table IV.5 
reports the results of testing the difference in the marginal impacts of Democrats and 
Republicans. In each of the 3 equations containing political variables and their interaction 
terms, the null hypothesis that Democrats and Republicans have equal impacts on the 
change in state tax rates is rejected with associated p-values consistently ranging from 
0.013 to 0.016. The results suggest that the impact of Republican legislatures is different 
than the impact of Democrats in determining changes in state tax rates.
The test results in Table IV.5 also allow me to make some practical interpretations 
on the impact of changes in the partisan makeup of state As a practical matter, I ask what 
difference political party control o f the state legislature means for the change in state tax 
rates. Using the value o f the difference between the marginal impact of Democrats and 
the marginal impact o f Republicans in equation 1 in Table IV.5,1 calculate that if 
Democrats controlled both houses of legislature for a given 5-year period, then state tax 
rate would be 0.4 percentage points higher on average than if Republicans controlled both 
branches o f the legislature for that period. This follows the conventional wisdom that 
Democratic legislatures favor higher tax rates compared to Republicans. Since the costs 
o f passing regulations and policies are less in the single majority party, states in which 
the Democrats controlled both branches o f the legislature had higher state tax rates. The 
0.4 percentage points different are also consistent in each of the 3 equations. This fact 
gives me more confidence that I have estimated the true effect of the political variables 
on the change in state tax rates.
For the sample period 1960-1999, the mean 5-year change in state tax rates is 
equal to 0.229 percentage points. Meanwhile, the overall mean Initial Tax Rate for this
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period was approximately 10.5 percentage points. Thus political party control of the 
legislature has a substantial impact on the determination of state tax rates.
IV.6. Conclusion
The empirical evidence presented in this chapter suggests that demographic, 
economic, and political structure variables are important for the determination o f the 
change in state tax rates. Percentage of elderly at the beginning of the period {Elderly), 
population density at the beginning of the period {Density), income share from 
agricultural sector at the beginning of the period {Farm), income share from 
manufacturing sector at the beginning of the period {Manufacturing), and educational 
attainment at the beginning of the period {Education) appear to be significant 
determinants in at least 2 out o f 6 equations at the 10 percent significance level. In 
general, states whose economies are more concentrated in the agricultural or 
manufacturing, and whose more elderly and whose populations are more educated are 
estimated to be less likely to increase taxes than other states, while states having higher 
population densities are estimated to be more likely to increase taxes than less densely 
populated states.
In the matter of political structure variables, there are two major findings from the 
results. First, political variables are important for the determination o f the change in state 
tax rates. ADA Average, Republican Legislature, and Democrat Legislature show 
significant and appropriate signs of coefficient estimates as expected with at least a 10 
percent significance level. States whose federal legislators are characterized by higher 
ADA scores are more likely to increase taxes. Moreover, states in which Republicans 
control both houses of the state legislature are less likely to raise taxes during that period
84
while Democrats are more likely to raise taxes when they control both houses of the state 
legislature. This finding provides prima facie evidence that these variables can serve as 
instruments in two-stage least squares estimations of the state growth equations. Second, 
the sign estimates and significances of political variables are shown to be robust to the 
inclusion of the set of the conditioning variables into the model.
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Table IV.l: The Estimated Effect of Demographic Variables on












Taxes 1 ) Unemployment rate
2) The proportion of 
population aged 5 - 1 7  
years old
3) The proportion of 











Taxes 1 ) The proportion of 
population aged 5 - 1 7  
years old
2) The proportion of 












Expenditures 1) The proportion of 
population aged 5 - 1 7  
years old
2) The proportion of 















at 5%  level?
Poterba
(1997)"
Expenditures 1) The proportion of the 
population aged 5 - 1 7  
years old
Negative Sometimes
2) The proportion of the 
population aged 65 and 
above
Mixed Sometimes
3) The fraction of 
population who own 
homes
Positive Yes
4) The fraction of 
population who live in 
urban areas
Negative Sometimes
5) The fraction of non­
white population
Positive No







Expenditures 1) The proportion of the 
population aged 5 - 1 7  
years old
2) The fraction of 






“ Estimates taken from  Table 1, page 819 o f  Alt and Lowery (1994).
 ̂Estimates taken from  Table 4, page 37 o f  Besley and Case (AER, 1995).
Estimates taken from  Table IV, page 780, columns (l)-(4) o f  Besley and Case (QJE,
‘̂ Estimates taken from  Table IV, page 780, column (5) o f  Besley and Case (QJE, 1995). 
 ̂Estimates taken from  Tables 3 and 4, pages 57 and 58, columns (2)-(4) o f  Poterba
^Estimates taken from  Table 3, page 431, column (3) o f  Crain and Crain (1998).
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Table IV.2: The Estimated Effect of Political Variables on








Expenditures 1 ) Governor and the 
majority party of the 
lower house of the 










Taxes 1 ) Governor and the 
majority party o f the 
lower house of the 






















Taxes 1) Republican governor 
is in his/her last term
2) Democratic governor 











Expenditures 1) Republican governor 
is in his/her last term
2) Democratic governor 






















2) State share of state + 
local revenues
Positive Yes
3) Dependence on state 
income taxes
Positive No
4) Gubernatorial term 
limit
Positive Yes
5) 4-year Gubernatorial 
term limit
Positive Yes
6) “Party Stability” in 
state senate
Positive Yes










“ Estimates taken from  Table 5 on page 817, columns (1), (3), and (5) o f  Poterba (1994). 
* Estimates taken from  Table 5 on page 817, columns (2), (4), and (6 ) o f  Poterba (1994).
Signs and significances are difficult to determine in Alt and Lowery (1994) because this 
study estimates separate regressions fo r  each o f  eight different subgroups.
‘̂ Estimates taken from  Table 4, page 37 o f  Besley and Case (AER, 1995).
® Estimates taken from  Table V, page 782, columns (l)-(4) o f  Besley and Case (QJE, 
yppj).
^Estimates taken from  Table V, page 782, column (5) o f  Besley and Case (QJE, 1995).
^ Estimates taken from  Table 3, page 431, column (3) o f  Crain and Crain (1998).
^ Estimates taken from  Table 3, page 99 o f  Vedder (1990).
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Statistics
Variable Mean Std Dev. Minimum M aximum
Change in Tax Rate 0.2289 0.7102026 -3.8138378 2.1202783
Initial Tax Rate 10.5342 1.3424867 7.1526656 15.8320497
ADA Average 41.4217 18.1051594 1.8928442 85.4437721
Democrat Legislature 56.7778 45.7028742 0 100
Republican Legislature 26.0555 39.4106616 0 100
Elderly 10.6830 2.1125393 5.2 18.2
Density 158.7411 210.6379607 2.6320312 1022
Farm 2.7458 3.8446750 -6.5505760 24.2280664
Man ufacturing 16.9434 7.3811766 2.9743608 36.5557554
Education 14.3782 5.8955821 4.220000 31.6742736
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Table IV.4: Regression Results 
(Dependent Variable = Change in State Tax Rates)
ESTIM ATES












































































Education -0.05140* -0.04548* -0.02387 -0.021626(-2.25329) (-2.01827) (-1.06842) (43.96685)





















1) State Fixed Effects
2) Time Fixed Effects
Other Control Variables 1) State Fixed Effects
2) Time Fixed Effects
1) State Fixed Effects
2) Time Fixed Effects
3) Time*Farm Interactions
4) Time* Manufacturing 
Interactions
5) Time*Density Interactions
Observations 360 360 360 360 360 360
0.4657 0.492567 0.51089 0.5364 0.665437 0.67561
(Adjusted R )̂ (0.3690) (0.39478) (0.41274) (0.43773) (0.56796) (0.57652)
AIC 1.8349 1.8000 1.7744 1.7375 1.51131 1.49711
(SIC) (2.4394) (2.4369) (2.43288) (2.42837) (2.3965) (2.4146)
Test of Significance: 
Political Variables p  = 0.00369 p  = 0.000749 p  = 0.0295 /7 = 0.021198 p  = 0.00649 p  = 0.0081
Test of Significance: 
State Fixed Effects p  = 0.000000 p  = 0.00000 p  = 0.0000 p  = 0.0000 p  = 0.0000 p  -  0.0000
Test of Significance: 
Time Effects
p  = 0.000703 p  = 0.000021 /? = 0.00173 p  = 0.00257 p  = 0.22565 ;? = 0.29128
Test of Significance: 
Time Interaction Effects -
- - - 0.0001 p  = 0.0001
NOTE; f-statistics are reported below coefficient estimates and are calculated using heteroscedastic robust standard errors. 
Asterisks indicate significance at the 5 percent level.
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Table IV.5: Estimated Effects of Political Variables
VARIABLE
Estimates Derived from Table IV.3.
Equation (1) Equation (2) Equation (3) Equation (4) Equation (5) Equation (6)
Marginal Impact o f  ADA 0.004895 0.005747 0.00578
Average (169) (164) (1.46)
Marginal Impact o f 0.0022 0.0009 0.0009
Democratic Legislature (ijw o (202) (2.21)
Marginal Impact o f -0.00228 -0.00272 -0.00285
Republican Legislature 00 93) (L38) (1.79)
Marginal Impact o f
Democratic Legislature
minus 
Marginal Impact o f 0.00448 0.00362 0.00377
Republican Legislature
p-value associated with test
of
Ho: Marginal Impact o f p  ~ 0.016 = 0.016 p  =  0.016Democratic Legislature -
Marginal Impact o f
Republican Legislature =  0
Ul
Note; t-statistics are reported below coefficient estimates and are calculated using heteroscedastic robust standard errors. Asterisks 
indicate significance at the 10 percent level o f significance.
 ̂marginal impacts are calculated at the mean o f Farm
CHAPTER V
EFFECTS OF STATE TAXES ON ECONOMIC GROWTH
In this chapter I focus on the effect of state taxes on economic growth. I want to 
estimate whether increases in state taxes result in higher or lower state economic growth. 
Previous chapters discussed the following “Model of Economic Growth and Taxation”:
àYs.i = Ysj -  Ysj-j -  f^o+ PiYs,t-j + f^7ATRsj + PsTRsj-j + ^  + //j + /I, + (V.l)
i -A
where s = 1,2,..., 45; t -  1964, 1969, 1974,..., 1999; and j  = 4. In this chapter I estimate 
this model. For my sample 1 use cross-sectional and time series data observations o f 45 
states with eight, 5-year periods of observations covering the period 1960 to 1999. The 
model and the data are described in detail in Chapter 111.
The dependent variable is the change in the log of state real personal income 
(zlTs,,), which is my measure of state economic growth. The major explanatory variables 
are the two tax variables, Change in Tax Rate during the five-year period (ATRs,i) and 
the value o f state tax rates at the beginning of the five-year period (TRsj.j), Initial Tax 
Rate. The tax rates are calculated using tax burden. I include these two tax variables in 
order to capture both the short- and long-run effects of taxes on the economic growth.
Since my specification does not hold state and local government spending 
constant, these tax variables should be interpreted as representing the net effect of taxes 
on economic growth. That is, taxes introduce distortions in economic decision-making 
that produce an inefficient allocation o f resources. These inefficiencies are expected to 
cause lower growth of real per capita personal income. On the other hand, taxes are used 
to fund state and local expenditures. Ceteris paribus, these expenditures should stimulate 
the production of goods and services and result in higher growth o f real per capita
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personal income. As these two effects conflict, it is an empirical question as to which 
effect is stronger.
I include a number of control variables to minimize the danger of omitted variable 
bias. Exogenous growth theory predicts that states with lower initial income levels will 
grow faster than states with higher initial incomes, ceteris paribus, resulting in 
convergence of state incomes. In order to hold constant this effect, I include the lagged 
value of the log of state real personal income at the beginning of the five year period, 
represented by the variable Ysj.j in Equation (5.1). I call this variable Initial Income.
Other explanatory variables are as follows: (i) population density at the 
beginning of the period {Density) -, (ii) the percent of the population aged 25 years old and 
above at the beginning of the period who have completed college or a higher degree 
program {Education)-, (iii) the percent of the population that is aged 65 and above at the 
beginning o f the period {Elderly) -, (iv) the percent of state personal income earned in the 
agricultural sector at the beginning of the period {Farm) -, and (v) the percent of state 
personal income earned in the manufacturing sector at the beginning o f the period 
{Man ufacturing).
Endogenous growth theory predicts that education will generate productive 
externalities that will result in higher rates o f economic growth. Thus, I predict that the 
coefficient for Education will be positive: states with higher levels of educational 
attainment should experience faster rates of economic growth. Other than Education, I 
do not have strong prior beliefs about the signs of the coefficients for the other control 
variables.
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On the one hand, Density may be associated with higher economic growth 
because greater population concentration may allow economies of scale and scope that 
contribute to growth. On the other hand, Density may have a number of problems 
associated with it that would serve to diminish economic growth. In particular, 
congestion and crime are two economic phenomena that are positively related to Density 
and that may serve to inhibit economic growth.
The greater the fraction of elderly in a state, the smaller the fraction of the 
population that is engaged in labor market work. For this reason, one would expect 
Elderly to be negatively correlated with economic growth. On the other hand, many 
states actively recruit retirees as a form of economic development. The idea is that 
retired workers generally import wealth with them. This wealth can serve as a stimulus 
to economic growth. By this argument, one would expect Elderly to be positively 
associated with economic growth.
Technological innovations have contributed to a secular downsizing of the 
agricultural sector over the last century. Economic growth is increased when resources 
are released from lower-valued sectors to higher-valued sectors. Thus, it may be that the 
states with the highest concentration of agricultural activity benefit the most from this 
economic transition. In this case, Farm  would be expected to be positively related to 
economic growth. On the other hand, it might also be the case that states with relatively 
large concentrations of agricultural activity suffer the most from further downsizing in 
this sector, causing Farm  to be negatively related to economic growth. Similar 
arguments apply with lesser force to M anufacturing, as this sector has also seen 
significant employment downsizing during the sample period.
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Note that all the explanatory variables except Change in Tax Rate are entered 
with their initial values or values at the beginning of the respective five-year periods. In 
other words, if my sample is the five-year period 1960-1964,1 will use values from 1960 
for “beginning of the period”. Statistically, the use of the initial levels is designed to 
avoid endogeneity in the model.
State fixed effects (jUs) and time fixed effects {À,) are included in the model to 
capture the influence of omitted variables associated with state-specific characteristics 
and national shocks that affect per capita personal income (PCPI) due to secular growth, 
business cycles, population trends, federal and fiscal policies, etc. These omitted 
variables may explain state growth rates,and may be correlated with the tax variables.
Table V. 1 .A presents a rank ordering o f the dependent variable. Growth, and the 
two demographic variables Density and Education over all the states in my sample.
Table V.l .B does the same for the demographic variables Elderly, Farm, and 
Manufacturing. These tables report that the states with the highest average, five-year 
growth rates in the sample are Nevada (26.50 percent), Arizona (22.79 percent), and 
Florida (21.46 percent). The states with the lowest average, five-year growth rates are 
West Virginia (8.38 percent), Pennsylvania (9.65 percent), and New York (9.65 percent).
New Jersey has the greatest population density (932.10 persons per square mile); 
Montana has the lowest population density (5.20 persons per square mile). Colorado has 
the highest level of educational attainment (20.35 percent o f the population has a college 
degree or better), Arkansas has the lowest level o f educational attainment (9.26 percent). 
Florida’s reputation as a retirement haven is well earned. It has the highest proportion of
^  See chapter II for a more detail explanation o f the inclusion o f state and time fixed effects.
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citizens who are aged 65 or older (15.05 percent). Utah and Nevada are virtually tied as 
the “youngest” states (7.35 and 7.36 percent, respectively). The states with the highest 
shares of earnings coming from agriculture and manufacturing are South Dakota (12,63 
percent) and Michigan (30.02 percent), respectively. The states with the lowest shares of 
earnings in agriculture and manufacturing are Rhode Island (0.24 percent) and Nevada 
(3.61 percent).
Having reviewed the motivations, methods and results from the literature in 
preceding chapters, I shall now discuss my estimates of how state taxes affect economic 
growth using different estimation methods. The discussion begins with ordinary least 
squares (OLS) and ends up with the Two-Stage Least Squares with panel-corrected 
standard errors (2SLS-PCSE).
V .l. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)
The specification for the OLS model employs a total of 59 explanatory variables: 
the 2 tax variables {Change in Tax Rate  and Initial Tax Rate); 6 control variables 
{Initial Income, Density, Education, Elderly, Farm, and Manufacturing); 44 state 
dummies and 7 time dummies. In this specification I assume that the error terms follow 
the usual classical assumptions of (i) homoscedasticity, (ii) no serial correlation (the 
correlation o f a variable with itself over successive time intervals), and (iii) no cross- 
sectional correlation (the correlation between state economies). I also assume exogeneity 
in the explanatory variables. In particular, I assume that there is no reverse causality 
between the dependent and independent variables.
The first column o f Table V.2.A presents the results for the OLS estimation 
method with state and fixed effects. Change in Tax Rate has a negative and statistically
1 0 0
significant coefficient. The interpretation of the coefficient is that an increase of one 
percentage point in the tax burden over a five-year period lowers economic growth by 
3.48 percent relative to other states within that same time period. The other tax variable. 
Initial Tax Rate, also has a negative and significant coefficient. It indicates that a state 
having a tax rate one percentage point higher at the beginning of a five-year period will, 
on average, grow by 1.5 percent less than other states over that subsequent period.
These two tax variables estimate different effects from a tax change. The variable 
Change in Tax Rate tells me the immediate impact on state income growth. However, 
after this five-year period, this tax change gets embodied in the tax rate level, resulting in 
a higher initial tax rate for the next (and subsequent) five-year periods. The subsequent, 
impact of tax rate on state income growth is shown by the coefficient o f Initial Tax Rate. 
The OLS estimates from Column (1) indicate that tax increases have negative effects on 
economic growth in the both the short- and long-run. The hypothesis testing I conduct 
shows that the tax variables’ coefficients are jointly significant at the 0.0001 level of 
significance.
Turning attention to the control variables, only the coefficients o f Initial Income 
and Education are significant at the 5-percent level. Both have the expected signs.
Initial Income  is negatively related to economic growth. A one percent increase in a 
state’s income at the beginning o f a five-year period is associated with a 0.1 percent 
lower growth rate during that period. This is consistent with convergence in state 
incomes as predicted by exogenous growth theory.
Education  is positively related to economic growth. An increase o f 1 percent in 
the share o f the population having a college education or better is associated with an
1 0 1
increase of 0.53 percent in that state’s five-year growth rate. The hypothesis tests at the 
bottom of the table indicate that both sets of fixed effects’ coefficients (state and time) 
are individually significant below the 0.0001 significance level.
The remainder of the demographic variables has insignificant coefficients at the 
5-percent level of significance. The point estimates indicate that, ceteris paribus, states 
with more elderly in their population or a greater concentration of manufacturing activity 
will grow faster than states that have fewer elderly or a smaller concentration of 
manufacturing activity, respectively. While insignificant, the size of the coefficient for 
Elderly is predicted to have a larger impact than Education. On the other hand, states 
that have greater dependence on farming or a higher population density will grow slower 
than states with less dependence on farming or a lower population density, respectively.
V.2. OLS with Heteroscedastic Consistent Standard Errors (OLS-HCSE)
I next relax the assumption of homoscedasticity by calculating heteroscedastic- 
consistent standard errors (HCSE). As the exact form of heteroscedasticity is unknown, I 
cannot employ weighted least squares. Instead, I continue to employ the (inefficient) 
OLS coefficient estimates. The conventional formula to calculate standard errors with 
OLS is biased when heteroscedasticity is present, so I follow White’s procedure^’ to 
calculate consistent standard errors.
With heteroscedasticity, the error covariance matrix can be represented in general 
form by
^'White, Halbert, “ A Heteroscedasticity-Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimator and a Direct Test for 
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Consequently, the conventional OLS coefficient standard eiTors are incorrect and 
the conventional test statistics based on these standard errors are invalid. The correct
covariance matrix for the OLS coefficient vector is now:
var^A ; = r (V.3)
White’s procedure rewritesX'LW  in an alternative form and replaces the unknown 
F  with the estimate of F  = diagjfe/,ej, } ,where denotes the OLS residual from
the nth observation. The square roots of the elements on the principal diagonal of
(V.4)
are the estimated, heteroscedastic-consistent standard errors. It is worth noting that this 
procedure only corrects for heteroscedasticity. It does not address serial correlation or 
cross-sectional correlation problems.
Column (2) o f Table V.2.A reports the results o f estimating the effect o f taxes on 
economic growth using OLS with heteroscedastic-consistent standard errors. O f course, 
the coefficient estimates are identical to those in Colunm (1), since OLS is still used to 
calculate them. The difference lies in the calculation of the standard errors.
Theoretically, while OLS produces biased estimates of the standard errors, the bias can 
be either positive or negative.
Comparing results from the first and second columns o f Table V.2.A, one can see 
that the differences are both negative and positive. The standard errors of the coefficients
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for the two tax variables are larger when estimated using OLS-HCSE as opposed to OLS, 
resulting in smaller t-ratios. On the other hand, the standard errors for several of the 
control variables, such as Density  and Elderly are larger.
Overall, however, the main results are unchanged: The coefficients of control 
variables Initial Income and Education are individually significant. The two sets o f state 
and time fixed effects are significant. The remaining coefficients of demographic 
variables. Density, Elderly, Farm, and Manufacturing are insignificant. Most 
importantly, the two tax variables’ coefficients. Change in Tax Rate and Initial Tax 
Rate, continue to be individually and jointly significant.
V.3. OLS with Panel-Corrected Standard Errors (OLS-PCSE)
As shown earlier, for general error covariance matrix, V, the correct formula for 
the sampling variability of the OLS estimates is given by the square roots of the diagonal 
terms o f matrix:
varfA; = .
The previous section allowed V  to consist o f a general form of heteroscedasticity. In this 
section, I want to allow for the possibility that V  may also consist of serial correlation and 
cross-sectional correlation.
Beck and Katz (1995) propose a technique for estimating V  when the error 
structure is characterized by (i) groupwise heteroscedasticity, (ii) serial (AR(1)) 
correlation, and (iii) cross-sectional correlation. Further, they advise that researchers 
assume that the data is characterized by a common AR(I) parameter, as opposed to 
allowing for separate, groupwise serial effects. They call this approach “Panel-Corrected 
Standard Errors” (PCSE). In this section, I extend my analysis by implementing their
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procedure. To implement Beck and Katz’s (1995) procedure, I have written my own 
computer code using SAS/IML.
Column (3) of Table V.2.A re-estimates the specification of the first two columns 
using OLS, this time calculating standard errors using Beck and Katz’s (1995) PCSE 
procedure. Similar to OLS-HCSE, the OLS-PCSE method does not change the point 
estimates of the coefficients. Only the standard errors and corresponding r-ratios change.
Once again, while some of the standard errors change, the main results stay the 
same. In particular, the two tax variables, Change in Tax Rate and Initial Tax Rate, 
remain individually and jointly significant.
V.4. Adding Interaction Effects
The preceding analysis used OLS to estimate the effects of taxes on economic 
growth holding constant a variety of control variables. Several estimation procedures 
were employed to obtain alternative estimates of the coefficients’ standard errors. In all 
cases, the tax effects were individually and jointly significant and estimated to be 
negatively associated with state economic growth. In this section I want to check for the 
robustness o f these results by adding additional variables to the specification.
I tried adding both quadratic forms of variables, and including interaction effects. 
After a process of hypothesis testing, I determined that the best extension o f the original 
specification added interaction effects between the time dummy variables and three o f the 
control variables: Density, Farm, and M anufacturing^. The practical effect o f including 
time interaction variables is that it allows the coefficients for these variables to change
■■ I also add interaction variables between Change in Tax Rate and Initial Income to let the coefficients 
for each o f these variables change relative to each other. The reason is because I suspect the causal effect of 
growth rate and tax in the first place (note: income is the component of growth). However, the regression 
result shows that this interaction variable does not change the main result o f the effect o f taxes on economic 
growth analysis.
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over time. This corresponding specification now employs a total of 80 explanatory 
variables; the 59 from the previous specification along with 21 time interaction effects.
Table V.2.B repeats the estimation of Column (1) through (3), only this time the 
equation specification includes the time interaction effects described above. A 
comparison of the respective R' values indicates a substantial increase from adding the 
time interaction effects: the R~ increases from 0.6533 to 0.7743. Further, a hypothesis 
test o f whether the time interaction effects are jointly equal to zero is soundly rejected 
using all three estimates of the covariance matrix: The associated ̂ -values never rise 
above 0.0001.
The main results are unaffected by the inclusion of these additional variables:
The signs o f the coefficients in the original specification are the same. The two tax 
variables’ coefficients, Change in Tax Rate  and Initial Tax Rate, remain individually 
and jointly significant. And the control variables Initial Income and Education 
individually have significant effect.
That being said, it should be noted that the estimated tax effects are substantially 
different. The OLS estimates of the coefficients for Change in Tax Rate and Initial Tax 
Rate in the specification without the time interaction effects are -3.4842 and -1.4965, 
respectively. The corresponding estimates in the specification with the time interaction 
effects are -1.9787 and -1.5922. In other words, the model with the interaction effects 
estimates a smaller immediate effect of a tax change, but a slightly larger long-term effect 
from raising taxes.
To summarize, the alternative OLS-based estimates all indicate that taxes have a 
significant, negative effect on economic growth, both in the short- and long-run. There
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are two additional problems I want to address. Ideally, I would like to weight the 
observations to obtain consistent estimates given the non-spherical error structure as 
described earlier in Chapter III, This would entail using feasible general least squares 
(FGLS) However, while the FGLS technique is able to accommodate groupwise 
heteroscedasticity and serial correlation, it cannot accommodate cross-sectional 
conelation. The problem is that there are too few time periods relative to cross-sectional 
units (states); i.e. T < N. Hence, I cannot use FGLS to obtain consistent estimates. While 
I would have liked to implement this procedure, Beck and Katz (1995) provide some 
consolation: Their Monte Carlo work suggests that even if FGLS could be implemented, 
one would, in fact, be better off using OLS with Panel Corrected Standard Errors (OLS- 
PCSE).
The second problem of my study consists of endogeneity. I am concerned that the 
variable Change in Tax Rate may not only affect state economic growth but also be 
affected by state economic growth. The results from Chapter IV identified a number of 
variables that can serve as instruments. Accordingly, I expand my study by employing 
two-stage least squares (2SLS) to obtain estimates of the effects o f taxes on economic 
growth. This should correct for possible endogeneity.
V.5. Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) and Two-Stage Least Squares with Panel 
Corrected Standard Errors (2SLS-PCSE)
As discussed earlier in Chapter III, the suspected endogenous variable in my 
model is the Change in Tax Rate variable. To illustrate the 2SLS procedure, consider 
the simple regression model, j  = a  + f i x  + s. The OLS estimator for this model is;
b = { X ’x Y x ' y  (V.5)
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where X  is the matrix including the explanatory variable and the constant term, and_y is 
the dependent variable.
OLS assumes zero covariance between s and x, E(SiXi) = 0; that is, the disturbance 
e and explanatory variable x  should be uncorrelated. If, instead, x and s are correlated, 
then it is not possible to assess their individual effects on the dependent variable y. 
Applying ordinary least squares (OLS) to the model under these circumstances results in 
inconsistent estimates. That is, even as the sample size approaches infinity the estimates 
of the parameters will not converge to the true population values. To remedy this 
problem, one can apply 2SLS. To implement the 2SLS, I need to identify one or more 
instruments for x.
Suppose that it were possible to find instruments collected in data matrix Z  that 
satisfied two conditions:
1. The variables in Z  must be uncorrelated with the disturbance vector e, E(ZjEi) = 0.
2. The variables in Z  must be correlated with x. Recall that this condition is satisfied 
in my model specification because 1 found that there exist political variables that 
were significant determinants of Change in Tax Rate.
The 2SLS procedure can be thought of as consisting o f two stages. In the first 
stage, each of the variables in the X  matrix is regressed on Z  to obtain a matrix of fitted
values X  :
X  = Z ( Z ' Z ) - ^  r X  = P z X  (V.6)
The first stage of 2SLS in my model specification has already been discussed in Chapter
IV. 1 showed there that political variables are jointly significant determinants of Change 
in Tax Rate, and this result was robust using a wide variety o f variable specifications.
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Consequently, I believe that political representation variables are good instruments to 
employ in the 2SLS estimation procedure.
The second stage consists of regressing y on % to obtain the estimated /? vector:
= (v .?)
This method should produce consistent parameter estimates. The only condition for 
identification is that the number of instruments is greater than, or equal to, the number of 
independent variables.
To determine if my original specification has endogeneity, I conduct a Hausman 
test of endogeneity. Let the original model be given by = ZiSj + ajyj + where j/j 
is the suspected endogenous explanatory variable. Hausman (1978) suggests comparing 
the OLS and 2SLS estimators of aj as a formal test o f endogeneity: if the suspected 
endogenous variable is really exogenous, then OLS and 2SLS will both produce 
consistent estimates o f aj,  and the two estimates should be “close.” An asymptotically 
equivalent version of this test is described below.
1. Regress y 2  on the instrumental variable matrix Z  = [Z; Z^ ]. Let 6 2  be the 
corresponding residual vector from this regression.
2. Estimate the model, = ZjSj + aiy2  + piC2  + Sj. This is nothing more than the 
original model supplemented by the vector o f residuals from the preceding 
equation. Note that y  y is the dependent variable in the original model.
3. Test whether the coefficient pi  is statistically different ftom zero. The null 
hypothesis states that the suspect explanatory variable is exogenous. Rejection of 
the null hypothesis is interpreted as evidence that the suspect explanatory variable 
is endogenous.
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In 2SLS estimation, asymptotic efficiency increases with the number of 
instruments. However, the small sample bias o f the estimator may deteriorate as the 
number of instruments increases. Further, as more instruments are employed, degrees of 
freedom are lost and this weakens the power of statistical tests.
In this study, I employ two sets of instrumental variables, one for each of the 
specifications employed in Tables V.2.A and V.2.B. The first set of excluded 
instruments consists of the three political variables, ADA Average, Democratic 
Legislature, and Republican Legislature. The resulting Z  matrix consists of 61 
instrumental variables; the 58 exogenous variables included in the first specification, plus 
the three political variables.
The second set o f excluded instruments consists o f six political variables: ADA 
Average, Democratic Legislature, and Republican Legislature', along with three 
interaction terms, ADA Average  x Farm, Democratic Legislature x Farm, and 
Republican Legislature x Farm. I include the Farm  interaction terms because I found 
that they added substantial explanatory power to the model. I tried other interaction 
terms, but their coefficients were not significant. The corresponding Z  matrix for the 
second specification consists of 85 instrumental variables; the 79 exogenous variables 
included in the OLS second specification, plus the six political variables.
Good instruments satisfy the following two criteria. First, they are significantly 
correlated with the included endogenous variable. Second, they are uncorrelated with the 
error term. The following two tests are designed to indicate whether my instruments 
satisfy these conditions.
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In 2SLS, the first stage consists of estimating the included endogenous variable 
on the full set of instruments. As Bound, Jaeger, and Baker (1995) demonstrate, it is 
important that the “excluded instrumental variables” be jointly significant in the first 
stage equation. They recommend performing a partial F  test with the null hypothesis 
being that the excluded instrumental variables all have zero coefficients.
For the two specifications described above, this consists of testing whether the 
sets of coefficients corresponding to the variables (i) ADA Average, Democratic 
Legislature, and Republican Legislature, and (ii) ADA Average, Democratic 
Legislature, Republican Legislature, ADA Average x Farm, Democratic Legislature x 
Farm, and Republican Legislature x Farm  are jointly equal to zero. Rejection of this 
hypothesis is evidence that my instruments satisfy the first criterion of a good instrument. 
In Tables V.2.A and V.2.B, I identify this test as the Stage Test of Excluded 
Instruments.”
When the original equation is exactly identified, it is impossible to test whether 
the instruments are uncorrelated with the error term, outside of their role as predictors of 
the included endogenous variable. However, both of my specifications are over­
identified; that is, the number of instruments is greater than the number o f explanatory 
variables. To check whether the instruments that over-identify the model are valid 
instruments, I conduct a hypothesis test recommended by Bollen (1996).
The corresponding null hypothesis is that the residuals are independent o f the 
instrumental variables. The test is carried out as follows:
1. Calculate e, the vector o f residuals from regressing the dependent variable on the 
explanatory variables in the original (endogenous) specification.
I l l
2. Regress e on all the instrumental variables in an auxiliary equation and save the
corresponding R' value.
3. Form the test statistic: %' = n- R ' , where n is the sample size.
4. The test statistic has a chi-squared distribution with degrees of freedom equal to
the number of instruments less the number of right hand side variables in the 
original equation.
5. The null hypothesis is that the instruments are uncorrelated with the dependent 
variable, a necessary condition for variables to be good instruments.
Failure to reject the null hypothesis is evidence that my instruments satisfy the second 
criterion of a good instrument. In Tables V.2.A and V.2.B, I identify this test as the “2"‘* 
Stage Test o f Excluded Instruments.”
Column (4) of Table V.2.A reports the results of re-estimating the first 
specification using conventional 2SLS. The last three rows of the table report the (i) 
Hausman test, (ii) the Stage Test of Excluded Instruments, and (iii) the 2"'* Stage Test 
of Excluded Instruments. The Hausman test shows little evidence of endogeneity. In 
fact, the corresponding ^-value is close to 1. Correspondingly, the coefficient estimates 
for the 2SLS estimates are very close to the OLS estimates. Even so, the tax variables’ 
coefficients continue to be jointly significant at well below the 5 percent level.
Column (5) of Table V.2.A generalizes the error structure to allow for (i) 
heteroscedasticity, (ii) serial correlation, and (iii) cross-sectional correlation. As 
discussed above, panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) are calculated to produce 
correct standard errors for this more general error structure. Again, there is little 
substantial change in the results: the tax variables’ coefficients are still jointly significant.
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Columns (4) and (5) of TABLE V.2.B repeat the preceding analysis, this time 
using the more expanded specification including the interaction effects. The Hausman 
test, reported at the bottom of the table, just barely fails to reject the null hypothesis of 
exogeneity at the 5 percent level. The t-value is 1.91, and the associated p-value is 
0.0569. The next row reports the L' Stage Test of Excluded Instruments. The null 
hypothesis that the political variables with interaction effects are unrelated to Change in 
Tax Rate is strongly rejected. This is evidence that these variables satisfy the first 
criterion of a good instrument.
The last row reports the 2"  ̂ Stage Test of Excluded Instruments. This test 
estimates whether the excluded instruments are unrelated to the dependent variable aside 
from their influence on the included endogenous variable. Unfortunately, the null 
hypothesis is rejected, suggesting that at least one of the excluded instruments belongs in 
the original equation.
The 2SLS coefficient estimates reported at the top of the table show that 
correcting for endogeneity within this expanded specification has a substantial effect. 
Both the short- and long-term effects of a tax change—corresponding to the coefficient 
estimates for Change in Tax Rate and Initial Tax Rate, respectively—are much larger 
than the corresponding OLS estimates. The tax variables’ coefficients are each negative 
and individually significant in both the 2SLS and 2SLS-PCSE regressions. And, as in all 
previous estimations, they are also jointly significant.
V.6. Endogeneity and the Validity of the Instrumental Variables
The previous analysis finds that my set of instruments fails to satisfy both criteria 
for good instruments. In this section, I revise my set o f instruments to satisfy these
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criteria. I find that the two instruments, Democrat Legislature and the interaction 
variable between FARM  and Democrat Legislature, are the reason why my instruments 
failed the Bollen test. Accordingly, 1 exclude these instruments and re-estimate the 2SLS 
specification with the remaining instruments.
Table V.3 repeats the 2SLS estimations from Table V.2.A and B, only this time 1 
estimate 2SLS by excluding Democrat Legislature and Democrat Legislature x Farm  in 
the list of instrumental variables (Columns [2] and [4]). The coefficient estimates change 
substantially. In the model without time interaction variables, the Initial Tax Rate 
coefficient is now positive. In the model with time interaction variables included, both 
Change in Tax Rate  and Initial Tax Rate  are still negative. However, the sizes of the 
coefficients in both regressions have decreased substantially, and none are significant. 
Further, 1 cannot reject the null hypothesis that both tax variables are equal to zero in 
either of the two specifications.
On the bright side, the included set of instruments now satisfies both of the 
necessary criteria. The bottom of Table V.3 reports the results of the F* and 2"‘* Stage 
Tests of the excluded instruments. When the interaction terms are not included (cf. 
Column [2]), I find that the political variables are (i) significantly related to Change in 
Tax Rate (the corresponding p-value is 0.0028); and (ii) insignificantly related to the 
residual term in the auxiliary equation (p-value is 0.2685). The results are similar when 
the interaction terms are included (cf. Column [4]). The corresponding p-values for the 
two tests are 0.0166 and 0.2245, respectively.
I now turn to the results for the Hausman tests of exogeneity, also reported at the 
bottom of Table V.3. In both case, I fail to reject the null hypothesis that Change in Tax
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Rate is exogenous. The p-values for the tests in Columns (2) and (4) are 0.0868 and 
0.9100, respectively. Therefore, I conclude that the problem of endogeneity of Changes 
in Tax Rate in my model does not exist, at least not as severe as I expected before. The 
conventional OLS and its variants, especially OLS with panel-corrected standard errors 
(OLS-PCSE) estimation methods are good enough to produce the estimates for 
explaining the effect of taxes on economic growth.
V.7. Summary
Having compared and analyzed the results of different estimation methods, 1 am 
confident that taxes, both initially and subsequently, have a negative impact on state 
economic growth. Increases in Change in Tax Rate and a higher level of Initial Tax 
Rate at the beginning of the five-year period will lead to lower economic growth. All the 
different OLS estimation methods I conduct in this study suggest the same conclusion of 
the negative effect of tax variables on state growth. While I obtain different results in 
some of my 2SLS results, in the end I cannot reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity.
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TABLE V.l.A: Rank Ordering of State Values for Growth  ̂Density, and Education
RANK Growth Density Education
1 26.50 (Nevada) 932.10 (New Jersey) 20.35 (Colorado)
2 22.79 (Arizona) 779.34 (Rhode Island) 19.30 (Connecticut)
3 21.46 (Florida) 691.63 (Massachusetts) 18.85 (Maryland)
4 19.17 (Georgia) 607.64 (Connecticut) 18.48 (Massachusetts)
5 18.48 (Colorado) 397.59 (Maryland) 17.70 (Utah)
6 18.46 (New Hampshire) 362.44 (New York) 17.63 (California)
7 17.52 (Virginia) 287.16 (Delaware) 17.44 (Virginia)
8 17.39 (North Carolina) 259.99 (Pennsylvania) 17.33 (New Jersey)
9 17.19 (Texas) 256.85 (Ohio) 17.15 (Washington)
10 16.91 (South Carolina) 198.28 (Illinois) 17.13 (Vermont)
11 16.86 (Utah) 159.25 (Florida) 16.68 (New York)
12 16.44 (Washington) 152.70 (Michigan) 16.50 (Delaware)
13 16.31 (Tennessee) 147.84 (California) 16.33 (Arizona)
14 16.21 (Arkansas) 146.63 (Indiana) 16.30 (New Hampshire)
15 15.55 (Mississippi) 135.70 (Idaho) 16.02 (Oregon)
16 15.13 (Maryland) 128.82 (Virginia) 15.84 (New Mexico)
17 14.97 (California) 109.33 (North Carolina) 15.47 (Kansas)
18 14.86 (Oregon) 103.86 (Tennessee) 14.98 (Montana)
19 14.51 (Idaho) 96.51 (South Carolina) 14.75 (Texas)
20 14.35 (Vermont) 94.77 (New Hampshire) 14.68 (Wisconsin)
21 13.94 (Kentucky) 91.44 (Georgia) 14.55 (Rhode Island)
22 13.69 (New Mexico) 85.95 (Kentucky) 13.98 (Illinois)
23 13.62 (Alabama) 82.38 (Louisiana) 13.69 (Florida)
24 13.19 (Delaware) 81.67 (Wisconsin) 13.55 (Idaho)
25 13.05 (Connecticut) 75.82 (West Virginia) 13.54 (Oklahoma)
26 12.72 (Massachusetts) 72.60 (Alabama) 13.33 (Georgia)
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RANK Growth Density Education
27 12.48 (New Jersey) 69.31 (Missouri) 13.20 (Nevada)
28 12.45 (Louisiana) 58.23 (Washington) 13.11 (Michigan)
29 12.09 (Maine) 51.60 (Texas) 12.85 (North Dakota)
30 12.01 (Oklahoma) 50.93 (Mississippi) 12.78 (Ohio)
31 11.99 (Wisconsin) 50.82 (Vermont) 12.63 (Missouri)
32 11.92 (Indiana) 50.14 (Iowa) 12.63 (South Carolina)
33 11.46 (Kansas) 40.81 (Oklahoma) 12.61 (Pennsylvania)
34 11.42 (Missouri) 40.47 (Arkansas) 12.58 (Alabama)
35 11.32 (Michigan) 33.07 (Maine) 12.47 (North Carolina)
36 11.29 (South Dakota) 28.53 (Kansas) 12.35 (South Dakota)
37 11.21 (Rhode Island) 26.08 (Colorado) 12.33 (Maine)
38 11.07 (North Dakota) 25.04 (Oregon) 12.02 (Louisiana)
39 10.45 (Illinois) 22.91 (Arizona) 11.57 (Iowa)
40 10.13 (Ohio) 16.21 (Utah) 11.39 (Indiana)
41 10.07 (Montana) 10.38 (New Mexico) 10.87 (Tennessee)
42 9.72 (Iowa) 9.10 (North Dakota) 10.69 (Mississippi)
43 9.65 (New York) 8.97 (South Dakota) 10.11 (Kentucky)
44 9.65 (Pennsylvania) 7.18 (Nevada) 9.41 (West Virginia)
45 8.38 (West Virginia) 5.20 (Montana) 9.26 (Arkansas)
Mean 14.22 158.74 14.36
Std. Dev. 1 7 7 211.55 2 7 j
NOTE: The state-specific values reported in the table consist of the average value o f that 
variable over the 8, five-year period observations from 1960-64 to 1995-99. 45 states are 
included in the sample: Hawaii, Alaska, Nebraska, Minnesota, and Wyoming are 
excluded for reasons discussed in the text.
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TABLE V.1.B:
R ank O rdering of State Values for Elderly, Farm, and Manufacturin
RANK Elderly Farm M anufacturing
1 15.05 (Florida) 12.63 (South Dakota) 30.02 (Michigan)
2 13.45 (Arkansas) 11.35 (North Dakota) 28.99 (Delaware)
3 13.35 (Iowa) 8.07 (Idaho) 28.97 (Indiana)
4 12.70 (Missouri) 7.93 (Iowa) 27.41 (Ohio)
5 12.65 (South Dakota) 6.23 (Montana) 24.64 (Wisconsin)
6 12.57 (Rhode Island) 6.03 (Arkansas) 24.05 (Connecticut)
7 12.47 (Kansas) 4.63 (Mississippi) 23.66 (South Carolina)
8 12.41 (Pennsylvania) 4.57 (Kansas) 23.48 (North Carolina)
9 12.16 (Massachusetts) 3.57 (North Carolina) 23.23 (Pennsylvania)
10 12.11 (Maine) 3.33 (Kentucky) 21.77 (Tennessee)
11 12.11 (West Virginia) 3.23 (Vermont) 21.09 (New Hampshire)
12 11.97 (Oklahoma) 2.92 (Oklahoma) 21.00 (Illinois)
13 11.76 (North Dakota) 2.92 (Wisconsin) 20.81 (Rhode Island)
14 11.61 (New York) 2.78 (New Mexico) 20.31 (Massachusetts)
15 11.57 (Wisconsin) 2.35 (Oregon) 19.88 (New Jersey)
16 11.50 (Oregon) 2.34 (Washington) 19.53 (Alabama)
17 11.17 (Connecticut) 2.31 (Alabama) 19.04 (Missouri)
18 11.17 (Vermont) 2.30 (Colorado) 19.03 (Vermont)
19 11.01 (New Jersey) 2.24 (Arizona) 18.77 (Maine)
20 10.97 (Kentucky) 2.21 (Georgia) 17.53 (Kentucky)
21 10.91 (New Hampshire) 2.18 (Missouri) 17.45 (Mississippi)
22 10.81 (Illinois) 2.16 (Maine) 17.34 (Georgia)
23 10.69 (Mississippi) 2.09 (Indiana) 17.18 (West Virginia)
24 10.69 (Montana) 2.02 (Texas) 17.08 (Oregon)
25 10.66 (Ohio) 1.97 (Florida) 16.96 (Arkansas)
26 10.57 (Indiana) 1.97 (South Carolina) 16.87 (Iowa)
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RANK Elderly Farm Man ufacturing
27 10.57 (Tennessee) 1.84 (California) 16.37 (New York)
28 10.47 (Alabama) 1.75 (Tennessee) 16.17 (Washington)
29 10.26 (Washington) 1.70 (Louisiana) 15.36 (California)
30 9.87 (Idaho) 1.47 (Delaware) 13.95 (Kansas)
31 9.70 (Michigan) 1.42 (Illinois) 13.87 (Texas)
32 9.47 (California) 1.30 (Utah) 13.08 (Virginia)
33 9.42 (Arizona) 1.14 (Virginia) 12.79 (Utah)
34 9.39 (Delaware) 0.94 (Ohio) 12.38 (Idaho)
35 9.31 (North Carolina) 0.84 (Michigan) 12.21 (Louisiana)
36 9.16 (Louisiana) 0.83 (Nevada) 11.92 (Oklahoma)
37 8.92 (Texas) 0.67 (Pennsylvania) 11.45 (Maryland)
38 8.77 (Virginia) 0.65 (Maryland) 11.26 (Colorado)
39 8.76 (Maryland) 0.59 (New Hampshire) 11.08 (Arizona)
40 8.65 (Colorado) 0.52 (West Virginia) 8.20 (Florida)
41 8.60 (Georgia) 0.42 (Connecticut) 6.89 (Montana)
42 8.57 (South Carolina) 0.39 (New York) 6.55 (South Dakota)
43 7.95 (New Mexico) 0.31 (New Jersey) 5.05 (New Mexico)
44 7.36 (Nevada) 0.26 (Massachusetts) 4.09 (North Dakota)
45 7.35 (Utah) 0.24 (Rhode Island) 3.61 (Nevada)
Mean 10.68 2.75 16.94
Std. Dev. 1.70 2.74 6.59
NOTE: The state-specific values reported in the table consist of the average value o f that 
variable over the 8, five-year period observations from 1960-64 to 1995-99. 45 states are 
included in the sample: Hawaii, Alaska, Nebraska, Minnesota, and Wyoming are 
excluded for reasons discussed in the text.
119
TABLE V.2.A:











Change in Tax Rate
-3.4842 -3.4842 -3.4842 -3.4764 -3.4764
(-7.31) (-4.07) (-4.49) (-2.09) ^L73)
Initial Tax Rate
-1.4965 -1.4965 -1.4965 -1.4926 -1.4926
C3.12) (-2.44) (-2.25) (-1.59) 04 J3 )
Initiallncome
-0.1004 -0.1004 -0.1004 -0.1004 -0.1004
(-3.83) (-3.50) (-2.38) (-3.82) C2J5)
Density -0.0298 -0.0298
-0.0298 -0.0298 -0.0298
(-1.69) (-1.89) (-1.74) (-1.58) (-1.45)
Education
0.5324 0.5324 0.5324 0.5328 &5328
C173) (2.92) (2 43) (2 51) (2.14)
Elderly
0.7834 0.7834 0.7834 0.7843 0.7843
(1.83) (1.88) (1.62) (1.67) (1.36)
Farm
-0.2798 -0.2798 -0.2798 -0.2792 -0.2792
(-1.76) (-0.87) (-0.77) (-1.40) (-0.46)
Man ufacturing 0.1177
0.1177 0.1177 -0.1182 -0.1182











i s l s -p c s e ”
(5)
Other Control State Fixed Effects State Fixed Effects State Fixed Effects State Fixed Effects State Fixed Effects
Variables Time Fixed Effects Time Fixed Effects Time Fixed Effects Time Fixed Effects Time Fixed Effects
Observations 0360 360 360 360 360
0.6533 0.6533 0.6533
(Adjusted R )̂ (0.5852) (0.5852) (0.5852)
HYPOTHESIS TESTS
Significance of Tax F  =26.954 F  =8.498 F  =28.262 F  =2.377 F =  33.917
Variables' (p-value = 0.0001) (p-value = 0.0003) (p-value = 0.0001) (p-value = 0.0090) (p-value =0.0001)
Significance of State F  =3.965 F =  6.740 F = 5 .1 3 4 F  =3.963 F  =9.384
Fixed Effects'* (p-value = 0.0001) (p-value = 0.0001) (p-value = 0.0001) (p-value = 0.0001) (p-value = 0.0001)
SigniGcance of Time F =  11.504 F  =15.454 F =  12.042 F =  11.198 F =  21.079
Fixed Effects' (p-value = 0.0001) (p-value = 0.0001) (p-value = 0.0001) (p-value = 0.0001) (p-value = 0.0001)
Hausman Test^ ---- ---- ---- f = 0.05 (p-value = 0.9607)
t = 0.05 
(p-value = 0.9607)
I®* Stage Test of 
Excluded 
Instruments^
---- ---- F = 4 .2 1 9  
(p-value = 0.0009)
F  =4.219 
(p-value = 0.0009)
I**" Stage Test of 
Excluded 
Instruments*'





“ Variables are described in the text. State-specific values of some o f the variables are reported in TABLE V. 1 .A and V. 1 .B. 
t-statistics are reported in parentheses below the coefficient estimates.
'  The corresponding null hypothesis is p ch a n g e m T a x  Rate  =  P lm tta lT a x  R ate =  0 .
 ̂The corresponding null hypothesis is that the 45 state fixed effects are jointly equal to zero.
® The corresponding null hypothesis is that the 7 time-period fixed effects are jointly equal to zero.
 ̂The excluded instruments are ADA Average, Democratic Legislature, and Republican Legislature. These variables are described 
in Chapter IV.
® The null hypothesis is that P ada Average = P Democratic Legislature =  P Republican Legislature = 0  mo. regression equation in which Change In 
w Tax Rate  is the dependent variable and the explanatory variables consist o f the 58 exogenous variables included in the first 
specification, plus the three political variables (cf. Section V.5 in the text).
The null hypothesis is that P aDA Average ^  PDemocratic Legislature =  PRepublican Legislature =0  in a tCgreSSion equation in wMch the
dependent variable is the vector o f residuals from the original (endogenous) equation, and the explanatory variables consist o f the 
full set o f instruments (cf. Section V.5 in the text).
TABLE V.2.B:
Regression Results (Dependent Variable = Growth of Real PCPI)
V A R I A B L E S "
O L S ”
( 1 )
O L S - H C S E * ’
( 2 )
O L S - P C S E * *
( 3 )
Z S L S ”
( 4 )
2 S L S - P C S E * ’
( 5 )
Change in Tax Rate -1.9787 -1.9787 -1.9787 -5.1060 -5.1060
0 4  1 3 ) ( - 3 . 4 5 ) ( - 3 . 6 5 ) ( - 2 . 7 8 )
Initial Tax Rate -1.5922 -1.5922 - 1 . 5 9 2 2 -3.132 < 3 4 3 2 3
( - 3 . 4 7 ) ( - 3 : 2 1 ) ( - 3 . 3 3 ) ( - 3 .1 ' t ) ( - 3 . 4 4 )
Initial Income -0.0971 -0.0971 -0.0971 -0.0847 -0.0847
0 3  4 2 ) ( - 3 . 3 7 ) ( - 2 . 4 6 ) ( - 2 . 7 1 ) ( < L 0 7 )
Density -0.0206 - 0 . 0 2 0 6 -0.0206 -0.0210 -0.0210(-0.99) ( - 0 . 9 8 ) ( - 1 . 2 5 ) ( - 0 . 9 3 ) ^ 1 2 3 )
Education 0.4675 0.4675 0.4675 0.4107 0.4107
( 2 . 5 4 ) C2 5 4 ) ( 2 . 6 2 ) C L 0 5 ) ( 2  1 1 )
Elderly 0.4383 0.4383 0.4383 0.2370 0.2370(1.11) (1.06) (0.90) ( 0 . 5 4 ) ( 0 . 4 5 )
Farm -1.0184 -1.0184 -1.0184 -1.0162 -1.0162
( - 1 . 1 5 ) (-1.45) ( - 1  7 3 ) (-1.07) ( - 1 .7 : 3 )
Manufacturing 0.4291 0.4291 0 . 4 2 9 1 -0.3060 -0.3060
( 1 . 5 7 ) ( 1 .( 5 7 ) (1  2 6 ) (-1.01) ( - 0 . 9 0 )
(OU)
V A R I A B L E S * O L S "
( 1 )
o l s - h c s e "
( 2 )
o l s - p c s e "
( 3 )
2 S L S "
( 4 )
i s l s - p c s e "
( 5 )
O t h e r  C o n t r o l  
V a r i a b l e s
State Fixed Effects 
Time Fixed Effects 
Interaction Effects®
State Fixed Effects 
Time Fixed Effects 
Interaction Effects®
State Fixed Effects 
Time Fixed Effects 
Interaction Effects®
State Fixed Effects 
Time Fixed Effects 
Interaction Effects®
State Fixed Effects 
Time Fixed Effects 
Interaction Effects®
O b s e r v a t i o n s 360 360 360 360 360








H Y P O T H E S I S  T E S T S
S i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  T a x  
V a r i a b l e s ^
F  =9.115 
(p-value = 0.0001)
F  =7.028 
(p-value =0.0011)
F =  10.045 
(p-value = 0.0001)
F  =4.927 
(p-value = 0.0079)
F =  15.582 
(p-value = 0.0001)
S i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  S t a t e  
F i x e d  E f f e c t s ®
F  = 5 . 2 3 3
(p-value = 0.0001)
F  =9.578 
(p-value = 0.0001)
F  = 6 . 3 6 6
(p-value = 0.0001)
F  =  4 . 6 0 9
(p-value = 0.0001)
F =  10.470 
(p-value = 0.0001)
S i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  T i m e  
E f f e c t s ^
F = 4 .195  
(p-value = 0.0001)
F  =  3 . 3 2 5
(p-value = 0.0001)
F =  4.311 
(p-value = 0.0001)
F  = 4 . 0 0 2
(p-value = 0.0001)
F  = 7 . 2 2 1
(p-value = 0.0001)
S i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  T i m e  
I n t e r a c t i o n  E f f e c t s ^
F = 7 .1 1 8  
(p-value = 0.0001)
F =  1 0 . 3 3 6
(p-value = 0.0001)
F =  7.315 
(p-value = 0.0001)
F  = 4 . 8 8 0
(p-value = 0.0001)
F =  12.176 
(p-value = 0.0001)
H a u s m a n  T e s t ' ' ---- t=  1.91 
(p-value = 0.0569)
t=  1.91 
(p-value = 0.0569)
V A R I A B L E S *
O L S "
( 1 )
O L S - H C S E "
( 2 )
O L S - P C S E * *
( 3 )
I S L S f
( 4 )
i s l s - p c s e "
( 5 )
S t a g e  T e s t  o f  
E x c l u d e d  
I n s t r u m e n t s '
---- f  = 3 . 6 5 3
(p-value = 0 . 0 0 1 7 )
F  = 3 . 6 5 3
(p-value = 0 . 0 0 1 7 )
2"** S t a g e  T e s t  o f  
E x c l u d e d  
I n s t r u m e n t s ^
---- y  =  1 9 . 0 4 4  
(p-value = 0 . 0 0 1 9 )
y  =  1 9 . 0 4 4  




 ̂Variables are described in the text. State-specific values of some of the variables are reported in TABLE V. 1 .A and V .l.B . 
r-statistics are reported in parentheses below the coefficient estimates.
The variables Density, Farm, and Manufacturing  are each interacted with the 7 time period dummy variables, resulting in a total 
o f 21 (time) interaction effects.
The corresponding null hypothesis is ^ c h a n g e in ra x  Rate  =  P im tta lT a x  Rate =  0 .
® The corresponding null hypothesis is that the 45 state fixed effects are jointly equal to zero.
 ̂ The corresponding null hypothesis is that the 7 time-period fixed effects are jointly equal to zero, along with the 21 time
interaction effects (cf. Note (c) above).
® The corresponding null hypothesis is that the 21 time interaction effects are jointly equal to zero (cf. Note (c) above).
’’ The excluded instruments are ADA Average, Democratic Legislature, Republican Legislature-, ADA Average  x Farm,
Democratic Legislature x Farm, and Republican Legislature  x  Farm.
K)o\
’ The null hypothesis is that the six political variables (cf. Note (h) above) are jointly equal to zero in a regression equation in which 
Change in Tax Rate is the dependent variable and the explanatory variables consist o f  the 79 exogenous variables included in the 
second specification, plus the six political variables (c f Section V.5 in the text).
 ̂The null hypothesis is that the six political variables (cf. Note (h) above) are jointly equal to zero in a regression equation in which 
the dependent variable is the vector of residuals from the original (endogenous) equation, and the explanatory variables consist o f 
the full set o f instruments (cf. Section V.5 in the text).
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CL58) 02  10) (-0.93) (-0.98)









(1.67) (2 25) (0.54) (1.08)
Farm
-0.2792 -0.0248 -1.0162 -1.0186










O ther Control 
Variables
State Fixed Effects 
Time Fixed Effects
State Fixed Effects 
Time Fixed Effects
State Fixed Effects 
Time Fixed Effects 
Interaction Effects’̂
State Fixed Effects 




V A R I A B L E S "
2 S L S * ’
( 1 )
2 S L S  w / o  
D e m o c r a t ’’ 
( 2 )
2 S L S ”
( 3 )
2 S L S  w / o  
D e m o c r a t  ’’ 
( 4 )
O b s e r v a t i o n s 360 360 3 6 0 3 6 0
S i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  T a x  
V a r i a b l e s '*
f  =3.015 
(p-value = 0.050)
F =  0.1741 
(p-value = 0.8402)
F  =4.927 
(p-value = 0.0079)
F =  2.193 
(p-value = 0.1135)
H a u s m a n  T e s t ‘d
/ = 0.05 
(p-value = 0.9607)
/=  1.718 
(p-value = 0.0868)
t=  1.91 
(p-value = 0.0569)
/ = 0.113 
(p-value = 0.9100)
1®* S t a g e  T e s t  o f  
E x c l u d e d  
I n s t r u m e n t s * ^
F =  4.219 
(p-value = 0.0009)
F = 4 .1 3 7  
(p-value = 0.0028)
F  =3.653 
(p-value = 0.0017)
F  = 3 . 0 8 6
(p-value = 0.0166)
2"** S t a g e  T e s t  o f  
E x c l u d e d  
I n s t r u m e n t s ®
y  = 14.004 
(p-value = 0.0156)
/  = 6.408 
(p-value =0.2685)
/ =  19.044 
(p-value = 0.0019)
/  =  6 . 9 4 8
(p-value =0.2245)
Notes:
® Variables are described in the text. State-specific values o f some of the variables are reported in TABLE V .l.A  and
V.I.B.
’’ /-statistics are reported in parentheses below the coefficient estimates.
® The variables Density, Farm, and M anufacturing  are each interacted with the 7 time period dummy variables, resulting in 
a total o f 21 (time) interaction effects.
The corresponding null hypothesis is p ch a n g e tn T a x  Rate =  P M H a lT a x  Rate = 0
C H A P T E R  V I  
C O N C L U S I O N
V I .  1 .  I n t r o d u c t i o n
The goal of this dissertation has been to empirically investigate the effect of taxes 
on state economic growth. As discussed in Chapter III, innovations in my approach 
include (i) an attempt to correct for endogeneity between state economic growth and state 
tax rates, and (ii) application of a wide variety of statistical techniques to address non- 
spherical error structures. I utilize economic, demographic, and political data on forty- 
five states (omitting Alaska, Hawaii, Nebraska, Minnesota, and Wyoming) from 1960 to 
1999. My major finding is that state taxes are negatively and significantly related to state 
economic growth.
As discussed in Chapter V, I find that taxes exert a negative influence on growth 
in two respects. Holding constant their initial tax rates, I find that states that increase 
taxes within a five-year period have slower growth during that period than states that do 
not increase taxes. Further, holding constant changes in tax rates, I find that states with 
higher initial tax rates have slower economic growth in subsequent years. Putting these 
two estimated effects together, 1 conclude that tax increases have both short- and long-run 
negative effects on growth.
My results contribute to a large empirical literature on the relationship between 
taxes and economic growth. As discussed in Chapter II, while most country studies find 
a negative and statistically significant relationship between taxes and growth, studies of 
U.S. states have generally reported a statistically insignificant and sometimes positive 
relationship between these two variables.
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In addition to my findings on taxes affect growth, I also find that political 
variables are important determinants of state tax rates. As discussed in Chapter IV, I 
conclude that states with more liberal federal legislators are more likely to increase taxes. 
Further, states in which Republicans control both houses of the state legislature are less 
likely to raise taxes during that period than states in which control of the state legislature 
is split between the two parties. States in which Democrats control both houses o f the 
state legislature are more likely to raise taxes.
V I . 2 .  L i m i t a t i o n s
Methodologically, this study is the first to apply Beck and Katz’s (1995) Panel 
Corrected Standard Error (PCSE) approach to estimate standard errors in the context of 
estimating the effect of taxes on state economic growth. As discussed in Chapter III, 
standard GLS techniques are unable to incorporate cross-sectional correlation (that is, 
correlations in the errors between states) because the number o f time series observations 
is less than the number o f group (state) observations. Accordingly, the PCSE approach is 
the only way to incorporate cross-sectional correlation in the estimation o f standard 
errors.
Unfortunately, I had to omit two states (Nebraska and Minnesota) because of 
missing values of the political variables for in my sample period.^^ The PCSE approach 
requires that the sample data be rectangular (all cross-sectionals have the same time- 
series), thus I must have no missing data. However, there is another procedure that I 
could have used to address this problem. Franzese (1996) has a GAUSS program that 
can be dovraloaded from the internet that allows one to apply the PCSE procedure to non-
State o f  Nebraska has a unicameral legislature. Minnesota had legislatures who served on non-partisan 
basis from 1959 to 1970.1 need these political variables to perform the 2SLS estimates and further to 
handle the endogeneity problem
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rectangular data.^"  ̂ Had I become familiar with GAUSS, I could have expanded my 
empirical analysis to include Nebraska and Minnesota. Given the robustness of my 
results. 1 have no reason to suspect that the addition of two states to my current sample of 
forty-five states would alter my conclusions. Nevertheless, this would be a useful 
extension to explore in future research.
Another limitation of my research concerns the use of instrumental variables. As 
discussed in Chapter V, endogeneity in the tax variables is a potentially serious problem. 
Thus, it is crucial to find good instruments for the change in state tax rates. Accordingly, 
I applied a number of testing procedures to determine the reliability of my instruments. I 
conducted (i) a Hausman test of endogeneity, (ii) a partial F-test to determine the 
seriousness o f finite sample bias associated with 2SLS (Bound and Jaeger, 1995), and 
(iii) a Bollen test to test for instrument endogeneity in the over-identified model. Most 
troubling was the result that, for some of my specifications, the Bollen test indicated that 
at least one of the excluded instruments is correlated with state economic growth. 
However, other specifications did not produce this result; and the estimated tax effects 
did not differ substantially between the specifications that produced this result and the 
ones that did not. Therefore, I do not believe my conclusions are seriously affected by 
this deficiency. Nevertheless, an exercise for future research would be to attempt to 
identify the endogenous instrument or instruments and re-estimate my results 
accordingly.
Despite these limitations, this study has met its purpose in addressing the 
endogeneity o f taxes, finding instruments for state tax changes, and estimating the effects
This econometrics procedure can be downloaded from: 
http://www.personal.umich.edu/~franzese/pcse.documentation.pdf
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of taxes on the economic growth. In the process o f doing so, it also brought forth 
evidence that demographic variables such as educational attainment also are important 
for state economic growth.
VI.3. Directions for Future Research
Future research could expand on the role of political structure, and the interaction 
of political structure and taxes, in affecting economic growth. This research could prove 
valuable to state and local governments, and political parties, in determining economic 
and fiscal policies. Such studies could potentially provide a more realistic picture of how 
local taxes and political structures combine to affect economic growth performance.
As discussed in Chapter II, a number of previous studies report that different 
kinds of taxes have different effects on economic growth. A state-level study by Romans 
and Subrahmanyan (1979) estimates that business taxes positively and significantly 
correlated with economic growth. Moreover, a country-level study by Mendoza, Milesi- 
Feretti, and Asea (1997) reports that consumption taxes are positively and significantly 
related to economic growth.
The structure o f taxes composing tax burden variables may also have important 
effects on the magnitude o f the dead-weight loss of taxes. In other word, a variable 
representing the structure of state tax systems could be incorporated in extension of my 
analysis. Given two states with the same tax burden, the one with the more optimal tax 
system should have higher growth. Accordingly, my research could be extended by; (i) 
decomposing taxes into different kinds of taxes to determine if they have different effects 
on growth; and (ii) adding a measure o f the optimality o f the state tax system into the
132
analysis. In addition, differences in state tax regulation and legal structures may coincide 
with differences in taxes and growth.
VI.4, Conclusion
In conclusion, my study estimates that lower taxes positively impact economic 
growth. However, I want to emphasize that this result should not be interpreted as 
encouraging policy-makers to cut taxes without considering other useful programs 
needed for economic growth. Since educational attainment is found to have a 
significantly positive coefficient sign on economic growth, fiscal policy-makers need to 
ensure that tax revenues will be used to finance important social programs or 
infrastructures like education and health.
This study also finds that political structures at the state and federal level, along 
with demographic factors, influence the determination o f taxes at the state and local level. 
In particular, my findings support the conventional wisdom that Democratic legislatures 
favor higher tax rates compared to Republicans. Future research can build on these 
findings by investigating the impacts o f taxes on growth using more advanced 
simultaneous models and estimation procedures.
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Appendix C: State Rank of the Average Economic Growth: 1960-1999
State Average G row th ' Average Growth^ R ank ' Rank^
Alabama 3.228410 2d2371 23 23
Arizona 5.433853 2.70839 2 2
Arkansas 3.592924 2.22923 17 17
California 3.676129 2.27721 15 15
Colorado 4.526743 2.64993 5 5
Connecticut 2.987003 2.06376 27 27
Delaware 3.083541 2.09463 25 25
Florida 5.230317 2.67588 3 3
Georgia 4.551564 2.65527 4 4
Idaho 3.682596 235672 14 14
Illinois 2.344493 ' 1.76591 43 43
Indiana 2.590044 1.87791 38 38
Iowa 2.229693 1.71593 45 45
Kansas 2.521011 1.83667 40 40
Kentucky 3.116827 2.10744 24 24
Louisiana 2.994961 2.07606 26 26
Maine 2.798994 1.97908 32 32
Maryland 3.609222 2.24733 16 16
Massachusetts 2.965735 2.01357 29 29
Michigan 2.493087 1.80736 41 41
Minnesota 3.341642 2.13435 22 22
Mississippi 3.430873 2.20908 19 19
Missouri 2.643171 1.92309 35 35
Montana 2.372772 1.79065 42 42
Nebraska 2.576810 1.87483 39 39
Nevada 6.504264 2.74365 1 I
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State Average G row th' Average Growth^ R ank ' Rank^
New Hampshire 4.296901 2.60052 6 6
New Jersey 2.967495 2.02218 28 28
New Mexico 3.424795 2.20474 20 20
New York 2.249826 1.74278 44 44
North Carolina 4.144730 2.55462 8 8
North Dakota 2.674500 1.93894 34 34
Ohio 2.186772 1.64558 47 47
Oklahoma 2.929235 1.98744 30 30
Oregon 3.577140 2.22446 18 18
Pennsylvania 2.219872 1.64669 46 46
Rhode Island 2.596506 1.89628 37 37
South Carolina 4.047750 2.42362 11 11
South Dakota 2.616021 1.91048 36 36
Tennessee 3.802545 2.38193 13 13
Texas 4.284484 2.59559 7 7
Utah 4.090984 2.43818 10 10
Vermont 3.405537 2.17805 21 21
Virginia 4.091468 2.45030 9 9
Washington 3.893816 2.40608 12 12
West Virginia 2.063884 1.46263 48 48
Wisconsin 2.722506 1.94306 33 33
Wyoming 2.884893 1.98090 31 31
NOTES:
' State Real Personal Income 
2 State Real PCPI
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